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Public Voices

The Founding of Public Administration

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Public administration is not a field whose intellectual history is well developed. Partly this is a problem of scale: compared to economics or political science, there are fewer people engaged in the field and interested in its evolution. Partly, though, it is a consequence of the way in which the intellectual history of the field has traditionally been approached. The author discusses the reasons why we ought to put more history into the intellectual history of public administration.

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For decades, public administrative scholars and historians have maintained that while Thomas Jefferson had an extraordinary substantive mind, he was not a formative figure within the intellectual, institutional, and constitutional development of public administration theory and practice. Thoroughly investigating Jefferson’s early political career does reveal that he was not interested in the daily operations of government, but as time progressed his lengthy career in public service began to transform his opinions on the relationship between good government and good administration and how sound administrative practice complemented many of the republican values espoused in The Federalist. Upon a careful examination of Jefferson’s retirement years, when he dedicated the remainder of his life to establishing the University of Virginia, the administrative genius of his mind takes center stage. In this role, Jefferson not only created Virginia’s first public institution for higher education but also dramatically reformed liberal arts curriculum standards for colleges and universities across the nation. Twenty-first century public administration scholars and practitioners should welcome this exceptional contribution to the intellectual history of American public administration with openness and with a renewed commitment to the institutional legitimacy of our field.

**Herman Beyle and James McCamy: Founders of the Study of Public Relations in Public Administration, 1928-1939**

*Mordecai Lee*

This article is an historical inquiry into the two scholars whose work served as the foundation of the academic study of public relations in public administration. Herman Beyle’s Governmental Reporting in 1928 and James McCamy’s Government Publicity in 1939 were seminal in their impact. Beyle explored the democratic purposes of government public relations, and McCamy, its pragmatic uses. In retrospect, both Beyle and McCamy had had an extraordinary insight, namely that the communication of information was an essential and increasing aspect of government. Since then, the subfield of government public relations has had its ups and downs, but may be on the rise again.

**Scholarship and Public Service: The Life and Work of Mary Parker Follett**

*John R. Phillips*

Any consideration of the founding of public administration would be incomplete without the inclusion of Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933), one of the great figures in the history of the discipline. This article is not an essay in biography, however. Given the great range of Follett’s professional accomplishments, the author undertakes “a daunting task” of succinctly relaying those aspects of Follett’s life that relate to her development as a scholar and social activist: her education and training as a political scientist; the evolution of her views on science and scientific method; her leadership of the community centres movement; her theory of community; her work as a consultant and lecturer on organization, administration, and management; her place in the history of the social sciences; and her vision for a democratic society.
That Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933) was ahead of her time in many respects is beyond question and is well documented. Yet, we continue to struggle with many of the same and similar questions that to some degree confronted Follett during her time. While formulating and examining these contemporary questions is important, we would be remiss if we fail to study the work done by Follett many decades ago. In fact, we would be wasting valuable time as we confront the many wicked problems that challenge the future. One may be surprised at how prescient Follett’s work is when paired with many of the modern questions we confront. Though Follett’s work can be and should be applied in numerous modern settings, the work can be readily applied to many of the important systemic questions and concerns confronting American disaster response. Delving into Follett’s understanding and often prescriptions for many of these questions can aid us in solving some of these problems. This voice speaking from across the decades needs to be heard and can offer us much insight into dealing with numerous modern problems. The many challenges confronting American disaster response provide a prime example of a modern day application for Follett’s work.

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The Apotheosis of Washington
by Constantino Brumidi, 1865

Adapted from Architect of the Capitol

The Apotheosis of Washington, a 4,664 square feet fresco in the eye of the U.S. Capitol’s Rotunda, was painted by an Italian-American artist Constantino Brumidi in 1865. A master of creating the illusion of three-dimensional forms and figures on flat walls, Brumidi painted frescoes and murals throughout the Capitol from 1855 until his death in 1880. The Apotheosis of Washington, his most ambitious work at the Capitol, was painted in eleven months at the end of the Civil War. The figures, up to 15 feet tall, inspired by classical and Renaissance images, especially by those of Raphael, were painted to be intelligible from close up as well as from 180 feet below.

Symbolizing the glorification of George Washington as a national icon (as the title suggests), the fresco depicts Washington rising to the heavens in glory, flanked by female figures representing Liberty, Victory, and thirteen original states.

Starting below the central group and going clockwise, six groups of figures line the perimeter of the fresco, representing:

• War, with Armed Freedom and the eagle defeating Tyranny and Kingly Power;

• Science, with Minerva teaching Benjamin Franklin, Robert Fulton, and Samuel F.B. Morse;

• Marine [achievements], with Neptune holding his trident, Venus holding the transatlantic cable, which was being laid at the time the fresco was painted, and a form of iron-clad ship with smokestacks in the background;

• Commerce, with Mercury handing a bag of money to Robert Morris, financier of the American Revolution;
• Mechanics, with Vulcan at the anvil and forge, producing a cannon and a steam engine; and

• Agriculture, with Ceres, the goddess of agriculture, seated on the McCormick Reaper, accompanied by America in a red liberty cap and Flora picking flowers.

References

Dear Editors,

After reading the article “Tenets of Public Management and the World War II Motion Picture Genre” in Public Voices (Volume XI, No. 1), I felt compelled to write a short piece about war movies (please see below). My own bias is not entirely pro-military, and yet I realize that there are lessons to be learned in all aspects of public service. I submit my opinion in a spirit of constructive criticism and because I believe that there is a small gem of public service to be mined in the film “Saving Private Ryan.”

Sincerely,

Emily Michaud, Ph.D.
Rutgers University, School of Public Affairs and Administration

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War Movies

Contractors notwithstanding, the military undoubtedly makes up a gigantic part of what is loosely termed public service, although appropriate metaphors are often negative. Coppola’s “Apocalypse Now,” Lewis Milestone’s “All Quiet on the Western Front,” Kubrick’s “Paths of Glory” and John Huston’s “The Red Badge of Courage” all deal with the confrontation of morals and ethics in the face of the war machine. Of course, none of these films occur within the context of what was undoubtedly a very very just war; although Richard Attenborough’s “A Bridge Too Far” represents a worthy addition, and it does take WWII as its backdrop.

The problem with war movies as models for public management or any other part of public service is that they are rarely centered on the reality of killing, collateral civilian casualties or jingoism. Rather, they utilize epic troop movements, courageous death charges and draconic hierarchy as vivid and often glorious backgrounds for personal courage and self-sacrifice.
Of the three major films presented as examples in “Tenets of Public Management and the World War II Motion Picture Genre,” I find only one, Spielberg’s “Saving Private Ryan,” that serves as a fitting lesson for public service and not for the reasons put forth by Dr. Schwester.

In my opinion, there is little to be learned from the fact that all military organizations must function within the realm of Theory X. It is also a truism that men under fire often make vital discretionary decisions and develop a spirit of camaraderie. There is, however, in the early part of “Private Ryan” a scene which establishes and sets in motion the élan of the entire movie. This is the discretion shown by what is undoubtedly a low-level female typist and civil servant who notices that three death notices are going to the same family. For practitioners laboring in the cubicles of government service, the decision to call this situation to the attention of her superiors and send it up the chain of command, humanizes the war machine and is a stellar example of dedication and discretion in the face of assembly line death notice templates.

“Saving Private Ryan” demonstrates courage, discretionary decisions, resourcefulness and the sheer luck of surviving, but it is in the oversized typing pool that there is a real lesson to be learned by public servants.

Dear Public Voices Readers,

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The Founding of Public Administration

A Symposium

“...It is hopeless,” he went on. “We no longer have the learning of the ancients, the age of giants is past!”

“We are dwarfs,” William admitted, “but dwarfs who stand on the shoulders of those giants, and small though we are, we sometimes manage to see farther on the horizon than they.”

– Umberto Eco, “The Name of the Rose”

All the great human events in history were probably achieved by what we would today call public administration.

– George Frederickson and Kevin Smith
There are many scholars, both well established and in training today, who are forging the path for the future of public administration as we close the chapter on the first decade of the 21st century. And this is a good time, maybe never a better time, to pause and glance back at where we have come from and the paths taken to get here – some were high roads, and some were low roads. I am certain we have failed as many times as we have succeeded, yet we continue to endeavor for perfection in how the administrative state serves society.

I doubt we have seen a large, serious treatment of public administration since Leonard D. White’s four books so aptly reviewed for their contemporary contribution to the field by our first author in this symposium, Alasdair Roberts, in his submission “What’s Wrong with the Intellectual History of Public Administration?” His outstanding contemporary review of White’s work first appeared in 2009 in *Public Administration Review* 69(4): 764-775. His work was so well accomplished and current in its approach that we should possibly reevaluate the intellectual contribution made by journal book reviews and their reviewers.

In this publication, Roberts admonishes us in his opening sentence, “Public Administration is not a field whose intellectual history is well developed.” Then he offers us two cogent answers why: one, “There are fewer people engaged in the field and interested in its evolution;” and two, “it is a consequence of the way in which the intellectual history of the field has traditionally been approached.”

Roberts states we train our graduate students in public administration to approach the subject as a “ritualized review of the Great Works,” beginning with Woodrow Wilson’s 1887 essay on “The Study of Administration” then adding various samples of the works of “Goodnow, Taylor, White, Gulick and Barnard; Waldo, Simon, and Selznick; Lindblom, and Etzioni; Downs and Niskanen; and so on.” Roberts emphasizes, “There is very little history in our intellectual history.” In his conclusion, Roberts proposes that “…we will be in a better position to resist radical but infeasible re-
form plans, either at home or abroad.” Then there is a second benefit... “the intellectual history of Public Administration will be made more lively and enjoyable than it is today.” I might add that a young Ph.D. student might also find a rewarding career exploring this aspect of public administration.

Stephanie P. Newbold seeks to expand our understanding of Jefferson through a thorough look at his work toward the last years of his life founding and developing the University of Virginia. Her 2010 book “All But Forgotten: Thomas Jefferson and the Development of Public Administration” is reviewed in this symposium by Bob Blankenberger. He tells us that her book “contributes to the literature on Thomas Jefferson and his place in the development of public administration.” Further, from Newbold’s book, no one disputes his intellectual ideas, but that often “historians and public administration scholars have differed on Jefferson’s importance as a developer of administrative practices.”

Her book may become an important opening of a new chapter on Jefferson citing his less well known and documented contributions to “intellectual, institutional and historical development of American public administration.”

Of an ever greater contribution to this symposium is an article by Newbold on Jefferson, “An Extraordinary Administrative Legacy: Thomas Jefferson’s Role in Transforming Higher Education Curriculum in the United States.” Here she portrays Jefferson as an “administrative genius.” Newbold is convincing in her scholarship regarding Jefferson’s extraordinary efforts to establish a truly American version of a world-class university. She sees Jefferson as having made significant contributions to the “development of administrative thought, and to the presentation of democratic governance by underscoring his role in establishing the University of Virginia.”

Next in the symposium comes an article “Herman Beyle and James McCamy: Founders of the Study of Public Relations in Public Administration, 1928-1939,” written by Mordecai Lee. Lee cites that “Beyle explored the democratic purposes of government public relations, and McCamy, it’s pragmatic uses.” He shows us “that the communication of information was an essential and increasing aspect of government.” And here we thought “transparency” in government and e-government were novel ideas. Further, Lee states, “Good government reformers in the Progressive Era (1890-1920) quickly grasped the importance of using publicity to inform the citizenry on public affairs. Publicity could trigger public pressure on politicians to adopt the reforms these Progressives were advocating.”

John R. Phillips provides the symposium with an article on the scholarship and public service of Mary Parker Follett. Phillips asserts in his opening sentence that “any consideration of the founding of public administration would be incomplete without the inclusion of Mary Parker Follett, one of the great figures in the history of the discipline.” Phillips avoids any painstaking reinvention of the wheel of contributions that is Follett, rather he writes, “This article is not an essay in biography, however. For purposes of the present study the following sections deal only with those
aspects of Follett’s life that relate to her development as a scholar and social activist: her education and training as a political scientist; the evolution of her views on science and scientific method; her leadership of the community centres movement; her theory of community; her work as a consultant and lecturer on organization, administration, and management; her place in the history of the social sciences; and her vision for a democratic society.”

In another article on Follett, William Lester provides the symposium with a specifically narrowed version of Follett’s work as it applies to contemporary emergency services management. In particular, he offers “an examination of transformative leadership principles as applied to systemic changes within the federal (meaning national, state, and local) disaster response system with commentary by Follett on these basic principles.” Lester believes that Follett’s voice “echoing from across the decades” can inform “our current understanding and response to the challenges” we face in the course of the reform.

Bill Wiese, a graduate student, contributes an insightful early view on the evolution of presidential power – a topic of intense debate today. It is often agreed that the evolution of presidential power started with Jefferson; others say FDR; still others point to JFK; and so on. It is rare that presidential power and Harry S. Truman are mentioned in the same context unless specifically referring to the unpopular firing of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. Yet Truman had a temper and could wield power when he thought it was necessary. He did so during the 1946 Railroad Strike. Wiese explains that this is where presidential power is leveraged against a civilian conflict rather than the clear Constitutional privilege of firing a general in the presidential role as commander in chief of the armed forces. Presidential power may have crossed an indistinct line, but not for the first time in history, especially since Jefferson exercised presidential power through the Louisiana Purchase without Congressional approval. Truman, however, wanted the striking railroad workers drafted into the army; and although this power was never granted by Congress, it remains to this day the single most radical proposal ever publicly made by any American President in relation to a lawfully organized labor action. Not even President Ronald Reagan’s firing of the PATCO air traffic controllers ramped up to this level of unilateral power by a president.

Congressional angst at organized labor assured passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Wiese puts things in a historical perspective – today railroads account for only 12.7% of the nation’s goods, whereas in 1946, 65% of all freight moved on rails. Thus, this was a far bigger issue than it would be now. “Every city in America depended on the railroads to deliver food, fuel, raw materials, and finished goods.” The rails also moved people, 770 million in 1946 alone. A rail strike would cripple the country and create havoc with the national economy.

In addition to articles, the symposium also solicited and accepted book reviews of current literature applicable to this subject. Of particular interest as a desktop research tool are two books by Jos C.N. Raadschelders, both aptly reviewed by William J. Miller. The first book, although with a 1998 copyright might be considered dated, but it is a “Handbook of Administrative History,”
while the other work is “The Civil Service in the 21st Century,” which has a more recent, 2007, copyright date. As Miller tells us, edited by Raadschelders, Toonen and Van der Meet, it “successfully highlights the current and emerging developments related to administration and civil service employees in an international context. Through these two works, we can trace the past, present, and future of administrative studies the world over.”

No symposium on the history of public administration would ever be credible without something on Woodrow Wilson who is arguably a major contributor to the field or is merely a minor player with a celebrity biography that would be the envy of any discipline. Here John R. Phillips reviews the 2007 book by Brian J. Cook “Democracy and Administration: Woodrow Wilson’s Ideas and the Challenges of Public Management” for which he obviously takes off from Wilson’s 1887 essay “The Study of Administration.” Phillips tells us, “For those interested in the history of public administration, Democracy and Administration is also a rich, comprehensive, and highly readable analysis of the evolution of Wilson’s administrative thought and his role as a founding thinker of the discipline.”

Finally, we come to my review of Nancy Isenberg’s 2007 book “The Fallen Founder: The Life of Aaron Burr.” It is not the first time an author has set out to rehabilitate someone famous or infamous who has fallen from grace, fairly or unfairly accused and convicted by history. Isenberg even offers up a bit of counterfactual history (unusual for professional historians) that Burr and Hamilton may have been friends if fate had dealt them a different hand. Apparently, both applied to Princeton University at the same time with Burr attending there, and Hamilton eventually attending Columbia.

I invited Isenberg to contribute her special expertise on Burr for this symposium, but she declined. So, we have only her excellent book and my very succinct review of it to reflect on Burr and his often forgotten or ignored contributions.

I am writing this introduction and commentary as I reflect back on this project that has taken more than a year to get to print, and I wonder if the authors and myself have succeeded in making even the smallest contribution, not directly to the discipline of public administration, but more hopefully to sparking a renewal of interest in the intellectual history of the administrative state. Let’s “what if” for a moment. What if we collected the historical manuscripts that have appeared in Public Administration Review and other journals over the past years? What if ASPA dedicated a panel to intellectual historical papers? What if a special interest group within ASPA could be formed with the possibility of a dedicated journal emerging from the group? What if scholars in public administration took on the task of writing the biographies of some of the great public administration scholars who are no longer with us, such as Dwight Waldo, Leonard D. White and others? If we can turn some of the “what ifs” into reality, then we can succeed in what Waldo says we lack: a philosophy.
What’s Wrong with the Intellectual History of Public Administration

Alasdair Roberts

Public Administration is not a field whose intellectual history is well developed. Partly this is a problem of scale: compared to Economics or Political Science, there are fewer people engaged in the field and interested in its evolution. Partly, though, it is a consequence of the way in which the intellectual history of the field has traditionally been approached.

Many graduate students in public administration will be familiar with a common approach to the subject: a ritualized review of the Great Works. Often we begin with Woodrow Wilson’s 1886 essay on “The Study of Administration.” Then a little bit of Goodnow, Taylor, White, Gulick and Barnard; Waldo, Simon, and Selznick; Lindblom, and Etzioni; Downs and Niskanen; and so on. With each year, the canon grows longer. Every piece must be read, its theoretical contribution extracted, and its place in the grand taxonomy of theories firmly fixed.

The premise is that the meaning and significance of each text can be determined by looking only at the words contained within it. There may be a misleading analogy to the natural sciences at work. We expect the theory presented in a text to stand on its own; we do not interpret the text or judge its reasonableness in light of the conditions confronting the author at the time of its writing. The value of a Great Work is determined largely by its relationship to other Great Works – that is, by its place in the taxonomy.

To put it another way, there is very little history in our intellectual history. For example, we do not consider what the condition of U.S. government might have been in 1886, when Wilson wrote his essay about the virtues of Prussian bureaucracy; we do not consider what the intellectual climate might have been in 1936, when Gulick proposed his principles of administration; we do not ask what the national mood might have been in 1959, when Lindblom proposed his happy view about the virtues of “muddling through.” These are not regarded as critical considerations.

This refusal to place ideas within a historical context leads to two major problems. The first is the
habit of taking a very uncharitable view of each author’s contribution. For example, Wilson said that Prussian methods should be transferred to the United States, famously arguing that

If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public bureau well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of my republican spots (Wilson 1887, 220).

Modern scholars would recoil from this statement, because we know from the horrors of the twentieth century that the distinction of motives and methods is not so clear. We have learned that the propensity to commit murder is aggravated by the availability of very sharp knives. Even so, it would be wrong to condemn Wilson for making the claim, and not just because he lacked knowledge of future events. Wilson’s concern was not to take a functioning US bureaucracy and hone it to the high level of internal discipline that we would associate with the wartime German state. His concern, rather, was to reform components of the US bureaucracy that were manifestly incompetent in performing the core tasks of a peacetime state, which had more to do with the collection of tariffs, sanitation, and urban planning, than wielding internal security and military powers. Wilson was concerned with improvement on the margin, which in 1886 which was much less problematic than it would be a century later.

Wilson, like his contemporary Frank Goodnow, is heralded as one of the fathers of the politics-administration dichotomy, or in other words, the idea that is feasible and desirable to draw a sharp distinction between the political function of deciding what government should do and the administrative function of executing the chosen policy. Today, it is a graduate-school ritual to show that the dichotomy is untenable, and that most aspects of administration are unavoidably political. This, again, shows gross insensitivity to context. Wilson and Goodnow wrote at a time when legislative and party influence over personnel, contracting and grant-giving was pervasive. Such influence was heavily restricted during the early decades of the twentieth century. No contemporary critic of the dichotomy would voluntarily return to a world in which splitting politics and administration was not broadly accepted as feasible and necessary.

There are many other instances in which an appreciation of historical context can lead to a more accurate and more sympathetic understanding of scholarly work. A recent debate in Public Administration Review provides an illustration. Laurence Lynn criticizes Leonard White, author of the first textbook in public administration, for encouraging an “anti-legal temper” in the field (Lynn 2009). (In the preface to his 1926 text, White argued that “the study of administration should start from the base of management rather than the foundation of law.”) Donald Moynihan responds rightly that this is unfair to White for several reasons; among these is the fact that managerial capacity in American government was woefully underdeveloped in 1926 (Moynihan 2009). It is not as though White was looking at today’s state and arguing that we give undue attention to legal constraints. He was looking at a young bureaucracy in which managerial knowl-
edge was not systematically developed or distributed. Very roughly, civil servants knew the law but did not know how to implement it at scale. In such circumstances, White’s statement was reasonable. When circumstances changed, so did his opinions.

Any work in public administration can be, and should be, understood in the same way. As Quentin Skinner has recently said, the governing assumption must be that “even the most abstract works of political theory are never above the battle: they are part of the battle itself” (Skinner 2008, xvi). To understand the work, we must understand the struggle or problem that produced it. This is a matter of historical understanding. Why did Luther Gulick worry so much about developing pure principles of administration? Partly because social and institutional circumstances pushed him to do so (Roberts 1998). Why did Charles Lindblom take such a benign view of incremental decisionmaking? Partly because the nation had enjoyed a decade of expansion and had not yet been rocked by the political and social upheavals of the 1960s. Why did Niskanen and other advocates of Public Choice enjoy such popularity in the late 1960s and 1970s? Partly because governmental bureaucracy was growing at an unprecedented rate, along with doubts about governmental performance.

There is a second reason why we ought to put more history into the intellectual history of public administration, which has to do with the way in which we think about the development of government itself. The conventional approach to intellectual history puts great emphasis on ideas, and the people who articulate them, as drivers of administrative development. To put it briefly, ideas are presumed to change the world. Weber made the case for bureaucratic government, and therefore government was bureaucratized. Osborne and Gaebler made a case for reinventing government, and therefore government was reinvented.

This approach flatters intellectuals and policymakers, because it assumes that they have broad discretion to determine how the structure of government will evolve. In other words, they are assumed to have a high degree of agency: that is, the power to manipulate the world about them and significant autonomy in wielding that power (Karp 1986). But this assumption is highly contestable. There are many respected historians who argue on the contrary that individuals merely react to the operation of much broader social and economic forces. (An extreme view was taken by Fernand Braudel, a pioneer of the Annales school of historiography, who once said that each individual is “imprisoned within a destiny in which he himself has little hand” (Burke 1990, 40).) From this point of view, each of our Great Works should be understood merely as an attempt to accommodate these larger realities. The theorists stand in the background, not the foreground, of the picture. In the extreme, the theory presented in a Great Work might be construed not primarily as a prescription (what we ought to do, given broad discretion to choose) but as a ex-post report on how this accommodation has been made (what we are obliged to do in order to adjust to circumstances). We could make an assessment of how well this accommodation is made, but to do this we would need to know something about the larger realities themselves. Again, we would need to put more history in our intellectual history.

Elsewhere, I have made an argument for the development of a method of inquiry which I have
called the *macrodynamics of administrative development*, and which I have argued was pioneered in a rough way in Leonard White’s four books on the early history of the U.S. government (Roberts 2009). This constitutes an attempt to find an appropriate middle ground between the view implicit in the Great Works approach, that agency trumps all, and Braudel’s darker view that agency does not matter at all. The middle ground takes the view that intellectuals and policy-makers do have some autonomy in determining the path of administrative development, but that this discretion is sharply constrained by a set of larger forces. These larger constraints include:

- Popular culture and prevailing political ideology;
- Features of the inheritance of political and administrative institutions;
- The stock of available organizational and communication technologies;
- Domestic economic and social structures; and
- The nation’s relationship with other states, and its place within the international order.

Of course, there are some scholars – mainly in other disciplines – who have tried to explain how some of these factors shape administrative development. What is needed in Public Administration is a more systematic cultivation of the larger picture. The role of an intellectual history course in the field is to show how important thinkers interpreted and responded to those constraints. And to reinforce the point once again, this demands a good knowledge of the constraints themselves. We must abandon our insistence on “the autonomy of the text itself,” as Quentin Skinner says. “Any statement . . . is inescapably the embodiment of a particular intention, on a particular occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and thus specific to its situation in a way that it can only be naive to try to transcend” (Skinner 1969, 3 and 50).

An intellectual history *that actually pays attention to history* will be more difficult to pursue. It is impossible to march through a few dozen Great Works in just a few weeks if we are also serious about learning something about the context in which those works were written. But there are also correspondingly larger benefits. For example, we will develop a much better sense of the contingency of reform prescriptions – that is, of the way in which reform ideas must be understood and judged as a response to a particular set of circumstances. As a result, we will be in a better position to resist radical but infeasible reform plans, either at home or abroad. In addition to this, there is a second benefit, which is smaller but still significant: the intellectual history of Public Administration will be made more lively and enjoyable than it is today.

**References**


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The Founding period of the United States represents one of the most important eras in the history of American public administration. As John Rohr (1986) has consistently argued, the intellectual, political, and historical legitimacy of the American administrative state can be found only within the nation’s constitutional heritage. As principal authors of the Constitution and *The Federalist Papers*, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison shaped the constitutional and administrative dynamics of the American state in profoundly important ways, and the ideas of both statesmen continue to influence the study and practice of democratic theory, representative government, and the rights of citizens in a republican regime.

By means of comparison, public administration scholars who have researched and investigated the founding of the American Republic have maintained that Thomas Jefferson made relatively little, if any, contribution to the constitutional or administrative development of the American state (White 1951, Caldwell 1988, Kettl 2002). While the field generally recognizes the substantive value of Jefferson’s authorship of the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, it has collectively maintained that the statesman from Monticello was not interested in the day-to-day operations of government, in the theoretical and practical development of American constitutional theory, or in the important nuances associated with sound administrative management.

The purpose of this article is to illustrate one of the forgotten contributions Jefferson made to the development of administrative thought and to the preservation of democratic governance by underscoring his role in establishing the University of Virginia. Of all the American Founders, Jefferson was by far the most outspoken on the responsibilities of a republican state to educate its citizenry. According to Jeffersonian thought, creating, maintaining, and permanently funding a system of public education at all levels of instruction was the best way to ensure the values es-
poused during the Revolution and Constitutional Convention would be conserved for future generations (Addis 2003; Carter 1898; Honeywell 1931; Malone 1977; Newbold 2010).

Those interested in the historical, intellectual, and institutional advancement of public administration scholarship should not lose sight of the fact that Jefferson maintained this position throughout his public service career. These deep-rooted convictions led him to champion the need for local governments, in particular, to create a system of state sponsored elementary education (Addis 2003; Carcieri 1997; Carter 1898; Honeywell 1931; Malone 1977). The majority of elected officials in the Virginia General Assembly, however, did not agree with Jefferson’s normative assessment but finally conceded the need to establish a publicly funded state university. Although Jefferson preferred to start building a state-sponsored system of public education from the bottom up (Addis 2003), governing the nation as president instructed him that often times when leaders champion new causes and public policy initiatives they have to adapt and remain flexible when elected officials agree to meet them half way (Newbold 2005). To say that Jefferson was elated with the Commonwealth’s decision is an understatement. He considered this achievement one of the three most significant accomplishments of his political career. 3

The purpose of this symposium is to emphasize the contemporary relevance of the American Founders: how they contributed to the intellectual and institutional development of the nation’s constitutional order and administrative state. Jefferson’s role in creating every organizational dynamic associated with establishing and conserving the University of Virginia (UVA) illustrates this objective in a clear, distinctive manner. The nature in which he used UVA as a platform to restructure liberal arts education in the United States clearly demonstrates his extraordinary legacy as a leading contributor to the preservation of American constitutional democracy, administrative history, and public sector management (Newbold, 2010).

Building a Public Institution from the Ground Up:
The Jeffersonian Example

After completing his second term as president in 1809, Jefferson retired from national politics and returned to Monticello, his home in Charlottesville, Virginia. For the remaining seventeen years of his life, he would never travel beyond the confines of the Blue Ridge Mountains. At this time, he pledged that he would no longer participate in political affairs, but five years later, his lifelong commitment to the establishment of public education placed him at the center of a statewide debate concerning the establishment of a public university. Although many of Jefferson’s contemporaries disagreed stridently that the state had a financial responsibility to educate its citizens, the majority of Virginians elected to the General Assembly did support legislation to create a state university for higher education in 1817. Upon learning this news, Jefferson quickly formed alliances not only with his closest political confidantes, including James Madison and state senator Joseph Cabell, but he also cultivated the support of new followers to champion this cause in an effort to build what would become one of the most distinctive public institutions in the nation’s history, architecturally, organizationally, and especially educationally.
Much to Jefferson’s chagrin, while the General Assembly agreed in theory to create the commonwealth’s first public university, it did not appropriate the necessary funds to establish the type of institution that would provide students with an intellectually challenging and rigorous classical education, particularly when compared to Harvard and William and Mary in the United States and Oxford and Cambridge Universities in Great Britain. Building the University of Virginia from the ground up was no easy task, even for a former two-term president, and securing the financial, political, and public support to implement this vision into a reality was one of the most daunting challenges of Jefferson’s life. Advancing science in its highest degree, however, was the most important goal Jefferson equated with UVA (Malone 1977), and creating a public institution capable of fulfilling this mission represented the most meaningful way to demonstrate how the American regime could conserve its constitutional tradition for future generations.

The historical evolution of the University of Virginia is complex and divisive. In fact, it was one of the most contested legislative and policy issues in both Virginia and around the nation at this time. The University first began as Albemarle Academy, which resembled a local commuter-type college for residents of the Charlottesville, Virginia area; then it transformed into Central College; and finally, with the passage of the University Bill, it became the University of Virginia that exists today. The policy expertise and negotiating skills Jefferson acquired while president instructed him on the value persuasive arguments bring to complicated and politically controversial issues, and he relied on these past lessons quite extensively as a means to persuade Virginia’s leaders to provide additional resources, appropriations, and public support towards this project. As tiring, time consuming, and demanding as this task was, Jefferson had the insight to recognize that just as history was on his side in 1776 the same was also true forty-one years later.

**Constitutional and Administrative Theory in Action: Changing the Course of American Educational History**

**Architecture**

Winning the political debate over establishing the University of Virginia proved the least difficult of Jefferson’s institutional battles. Once the General Assembly passed the University Bill, and used the state’s Literary Fund to initiate public appropriations for UVA’s permanent establishment, Jefferson turned his complete attention towards organizing a comprehensive structural framework in which to build Virginia’s first public university. He began this enormous project by designing the university’s architecture, which he described as the “academical village.” This included the Lawn, Dormitories, Faculty Pavilions, academic lecture halls, and the Rotunda. Unlike all other American institutions for higher education already established in the early nineteenth century, Jefferson designed UVA so that students and faculty engaged in all parts of university learning and living together.

The size and scope of this project remains uniquely significant, because at the time of its construction it was “one of the largest building projects ever undertaken in American history” (Sketch of UVA 1885, 1; Newbold, 2010). The field of public administration should also take note that in 1976 the American Institute of Architects confirmed that the University of Virginia “was the
proudest achievement of American architecture in the past 200 years” (Newbold 2010; Smith 1999, 1915). Jefferson modeled UVA's architectural design after a smaller replica of the Pantheon in Rome (Addis 2003) as a means to underscore the need for the university’s architecture to complement its curriculum standards and to demonstrate how the past can provide answers for the future. He did not want faculty to live in private homes away from the University’s grounds; instead, he insisted they live in the Pavilions, which connected student dormitories to the Rotunda, which housed the University’s first library, study halls, and academic lecture rooms. In this model, faculty and students learned with each other and experienced the academic, social, and community dynamics of university life together.

UVA's academical village is cohesive and purposeful in its architectural design. Jefferson wanted it to inspire students and faculty to embrace the most intellectually provocative subjects of human history so that the University’s graduates would be the most competent and capable of conserving the nation’s constitutional tradition in their future careers as public servants. In this capacity, he was trying to demonstrate the relationship between an educated citizenry and the successful implementation of the democratic governance process (Newbold 2010). Jefferson argued, with Madison’s approval, that this organizational goal distinguished UVA from every other American university and would soon lead to comparisons with most prominent European institutions of higher education. This distinctive mission and architectural design provided Jefferson with the necessary intellectual and institutional foundation to make his case for transforming university curriculum and building a liberal arts tradition in the United States.

**Liberal Arts Curriculum**

Like UVA's architecture, its curriculum was distinctively Jeffersonian. In early nineteenth century America, when college students began their university education, they decided on an area of scholarly interest, enrolled in the courses required for that degree, and after completion of coursework, they began an apprenticeship in that area of expertise. This was the educational model for higher education curriculum when Jefferson attended the College of William and Mary in the 1760s as well as for many of his contemporaries. As he progressed in his thinking about education policy and university curriculum, he started articulating the intellectual deficiencies of this model. He wanted American university students to have more opportunities to explore the foundational elements of human knowledge. Therefore, Jefferson required each student at UVA to take courses in ten subject areas: ancient languages; modern languages; mathematics; physico-mathematics; physics or natural philosophy; botany and zoology; anatomy and medicine; government; law; and ideology, which included general grammar, ethics, rhetoric, belles lettres, and fine arts (Addis 2003). To complement these intellectual pursuits, Jefferson also designed UVA’s undergraduate curriculum to ensure that students demonstrated a verbal and written proficiency in Latin, although it was his preference for students to master Greek as well. Once students completed these general curriculum requirements, then the University permitted them to select one of these areas to major in and develop a more precise knowledge base and understanding regarding the theoretical and practical specifics associated with a respective subject matter.
Jefferson’s design of the University of Virginia’s curriculum radically restructured liberal arts education, because it was the first institution of higher education in the United States that organized curriculum requirements vertically instead of horizontally. Dumas Malone, commonly regarded as Jefferson’s premier biographer, analyzed the contemporary relevance of this structural achievement in clear, concise terms:

Instead of a fixed curriculum, Jefferson set up a system of free election, and he organized instruction vertically in schools rather than horizontally in classes. A student could enroll in more than one school but was not required to do so … As Jefferson put it, the reputation of the University should be committed only to those who had attained “eminence” in one or more of the sciences taught in it, along with a proficiency in those languages “which constitute the basis of good education.” Jefferson viewed degrees with indifference and he made no provision for that of Bachelor of Arts. Diplomas were to be of two grades, doctor and graduate (1977, 419).

Jefferson maintained that his approach to university curriculum was designed to serve several purposes. First, it increased students’ knowledge of a broad range of academic disciplines, and second, it emphasized the belief that future leaders of the American Republic had to be well rounded intellectually. If not, the ability of younger generations to conserve the nation’s revolutionary and constitutional spirit would be jeopardized severely.

After reflecting on Jefferson’s life as a whole, it would be safe to argue that the only issue that trumped the need for the state to provide public education initiatives at all levels of instruction was the requirement to separate religion from politics, and there was no other endeavor that gave him more of an opportunity to integrate the need to connect state sponsored education and religious freedom than with the creation of the University of Virginia. One of the most distinguishing factors that separated UVA from its public and private counterparts around the United States was that it expressly prohibited the establishment of a department of theology. The Board of Trustees, led by Jefferson, also excluded any type of denominational influence officially or unofficially from infiltrating any part of the University’s grounds. More specifically, Jefferson and Madison agreed that the incorporation of a chapel or other types of religious worship places within UVA’s architectural confines would undermine the institution’s goal of teaching science and core republican values (Addis 2003; Malone 1977; Newbold 2010).

In 1822, Jefferson articulated this position with zero ambiguity: “In our university you know there is no Professorship of Divinity. A handle has been made of this, to disseminate an idea that this is an institution, not merely of no religion, but against all religion.” Madison agreed with this outlook in its entirety, and he and Jefferson’s stern position that public institutions should not be connected with any religion or theological preference was a central tenet they equated back to both 1776 and 1787. The American state would never reach its full potential if it were connected to any religious doctrine or ideology. In the heat of many contemporary political battles that almost al-
ways link religion to social issues, including, but not limited to, prayer in public schools, abortion, the right to die, and stem cell research, it would behoove our culture and our politics to underscore exactly how the American Founders felt with regard to separation of church and state. No matter the issue, no matter the cause, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison staunchly advocated for a comprehensive, separated sphere between public institutions and organized religion.

**Textbook Selection and Selection of Library Holdings**

As a result of Jefferson’s emphasis on vertical curriculum organization, he was particularly interested in selecting the books that would make up UVA’s library in the Rotunda and deciding on the textbooks for each school. He and Madison exchanged numerous letters between Monticello and Montpelier regarding the necessary books needed for purchase in a library that would come to represent a world-renowned institution for higher education. It should be of no surprise that, as Jefferson had spared no expense in building his personal library throughout his political career, he shared the same economic philosophy when creating UVA’s. Writing to Madison, he outlined his organizational structure for selecting key works for placement in the Rotunda:

> I have undertaken to make out a catalogue of books for our library, being encouraged to it by the possession of a collection of excellent catalogues, and knowing no one, capable, to whom we could refer the task. It has been laborious far beyond my expectation, having already devoted 4 hours a day to it for upwards of two months, and the whole day for some time past and not yet in sight of the end. It will enable us to judge what the object will cost.⁹

Examining the founding history of UVA as well as Jefferson’s administrative management style regarding curriculum standards, textbook selection, and library holdings reveals how dedicated he was to the substantive value of creating this public institution and how he emphasized the administrative necessities needed to implement his idea for a university into a reality.

**Bringing a Distinguished Faculty to Charlottesville: A Political and Administrative Accomplishment In and Of Itself**

Jefferson spent just as much time focusing on the recruitment of faculty as he did on selecting resources for the library and the University’s curriculum standards; in many ways, it certainly can be argued that he believed UVA’s faculty would be the central force determining the success of the institution. Jefferson and Madison both agreed that in order to build a competitive, intellectually demanding, and first-rate university, they had to recruit and hire outstanding faculty to lead the ten established schools. Writing to John Adams, Jefferson discussed the need to recruit faculty not only from elite American universities but also from Europe as a means to conserve UVA’s mission. Quite interestingly, Adams opposed his longtime comrade’s position on this matter and argued, “I do believe there are sufficient scholars in America to fill your Professorships and Tutorships with more active ingenuity, and independent minds, than you can bring from Europe. The Europeans are all deeply tainted with [religious] prejudices.”¹⁰ While Jefferson and Madison ap-
preciated this critique, they steadfastly maintained that the long-term success of the University of Virginia was dependent upon the ability to recruit the best scholars and professors, especially those from Great Britain.\(^{11}\) They did recognize, however, the significance of Adams' position with regard to recruiting and hiring a professor of law. Jefferson and Madison argued that only an American could assume this position, because only a native of the United States could fully appreciate the political, legal, and moral struggles associated with the nation’s Revolution and Constitutional Convention (Newbold 2010).

The historical account of the establishment of UVA not only reveals the amount of attention Jefferson afforded to hiring faculty, but also illustrates Jefferson’s policy for how faculty would be compensated in terms of salary and living accommodations on the Lawn, the administrative duties they would be responsible for on a regular basis, and how they would lecture and advise students in his newly created curriculum model for university instruction (Addis 2003; Cabell 1856; Carter 1898; Newbold 2010; Sketch of UVA, 1885). As a result of Jefferson’s influence in this area, UVA became the first American institution of higher education to require faculty to lecture in all of their classes (Addis 2003; Cabell 1856; Carter 1898; Newbold 2010). Jefferson’s impeccable focus on every detail involved with faculty recruitment, hiring, and retention sheds new light on his great interest in the minutest detail associated with the administrative management of public institutions.

**The Distinctive Organizational Structure of the University of Virginia**

Like every other organizational dimension of UVA, Jefferson created, organized, and led the University’s Board of Visitors and served as its first Rector. In this capacity, along with Madison’s approval, he insisted that UVA not have a president. Instead, he wanted faculty to be accountable and responsible for all judicial affairs. The faculty would also work closely with the Board to make decisions on all matters important to the intellectual, institutional, and economic development and growth of the University (Sketch of UVA 1885). Jefferson argued that this type of organizational structure would be best suited to complement the University’s liberal arts curriculum and the distinctive role faculty played in the implementation of UVA’s decision-making hierarchy. UVA’s Board of Visitors, quite interestingly, honored Jefferson’s administrative approach to university governance until 1904, when it made the decision to hire Edwin Alderman as its first president.

In his administrative role as University Rector, Jefferson kept meticulous notes on the status of UVA’s architectural completion, appropriations’ requests, faculty hiring, student recruitment and enrollment, acquisition of books for the library, and a variety of other institutional needs affecting the University (Newbold 2010). Between 1824 and 1827, Jefferson submitted detailed financial statements to the General Assembly outlining increased construction costs as well as other financial debts the University had incurred prior to opening its doors to faculty and students. Ironically, these government documents resemble what former Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton previously submitted to Congress in the Washington administration as a means to explain his administrative management and decision-making processes in dealing with the nation’s finances (Chernow 2004).\(^{12}\)
For example, in 1825, he sent Madison a memorandum entitled *State of Income and Expenditures for the University of Virginia, 1825-1827*, in which he outlined income estimates and expenditures for 1825, 1826, and 1827. These types of primary documents shed enormous light on Jefferson’s meticulous recordkeeping and attention to the smallest administrative detail. One of the central themes Publius espoused in *The Federalist* is that good government is dependent upon good administration. At the end of Jefferson’s life, long after he wrote the Declaration, the Virginia Statute, and served as a state legislator, governor, foreign minister to France, secretary of state, vice president, and president, his ability to understand and connect this sound governing principle to the theory and practice of administration had improved exponentially, and the creation of University of Virginia is one great example of his intellectual growth and development.

A final point that must be highlighted with regard to Jefferson’s role in forming the organizational structure of UVA was his emphasis on the honor code. It remains one of the strictest mechanisms to promote academic integrity among American university students to this present day. Jefferson, with the approval of the Board, implemented the following standards for student honor and integrity: “Punishments for major offenses shall be expulsion, temporary suspension, or interdiction of residence or appearance within the precincts of the University. The minor punishments shall be restraint within those precincts, within their own chamber, or in diet; reproof of the professor privately, or in the presence of the school of the offender … dismissal [sic] from the school-room for the day, imposition of a task” (Patton 1906, 127). Before embracing the most intellectually rigorous subjects of human history, Jefferson demanded that students first demonstrate the type of personal and intellectual character that was worthy of an excellent, distinctively American academic education.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this article has been to provide a new intellectual and administrative perception of Thomas Jefferson, one that correctly places him within the historical confines of American public administration scholarship. Leonard White (1951), Lynton Caldwell (1988, 2nd ed.), and Donald Kettl (2002) are correct in their observation that Jefferson had an extraordinary substantive mind; however, the notion that his vast public service career did not shape his understanding for how sound administrative practice influences the democratic governance process is an inaccurate representation of the latter stages of his life when he worked to establish and conserve the University of Virginia.

Dr. William H. Ruffner, former Superintendent of Virginia Public Instruction, noted in his 1872 annual report to the General Assembly:

> Probably no institution has ever been founded on this continent which, in the first fifty years of its existence, produced so profound an impression as has been made in the educational world by the University of Virginia. The reputation of its founder, its unique organization, its beautiful situation, its impressive and re-
markable architecture, its eminent professors, its thorough instruction, at once gave it character as the leader of Southern education, and as the peer of the oldest and best of American institutions.  

Ruffner’s insight into the institutional legacy UVA had on transforming liberal arts education specifically and American university governance more generally should not be lost to those interested in the historical and intellectual development of public administration in the United States. The last, great contribution Thomas Jefferson made to his country, quite ironically, is the most important he made to fostering the intellectual and practical legitimacy of public administration.

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Another key area of Jefferson’s contribution to administrative theory and practice is his two-term service as President of the United States from 1801-1809. See Newbold (2010) for a more in-depth historical account of Jefferson’s contribution to the development of American public administration.

To include: elementary, secondary, and university education.

In retirement, Jefferson authored his own epitaph and on his tombstone, he requested to be remembered for three achievements: Author of the Declaration for American Independence; Author of the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom; and Father of the University of Virginia.

For a more detailed historical overview, see Addis (2003); Malone (1977); Newbold (2010).

Jefferson’s recommendations came from the Rockfish Gap Commission Report, a blue ribbon commission, created by the Virginia Governor, to examine the economic, political, and educational needs associated with sponsoring a state institution for higher education.

The Lawn is known as Central Grounds today.

The University’s Library, which sits at the center of the Academical Village.


From “A Sketch of the University of Virginia” (1885). p.3
Herman Beyle and James McCamy: Founders of the Study of Public Relations in Public Administration, 1928-1939

Mordecai Lee

Introduction

This article is an historical retrospective on two academicians from the 1920s and 30s who, essentially, invented the academic study of public relations in public administration. This subfield has had an erratic status within the discipline. Initially, it received major attention in public administration textbooks and in the writings of some of the mainstays in the field through the mid-1950s. However, that attention gradually faded during the second half of the 20th century (Lee, 1998). But now, during the first decade of the 21st century, the subject seems to be regaining a modest profile in the literature and pedagogy (Lee, 2009).

In general, public administration is viewed as having parentage from the “real world” and from academe. The former comprise the good government reformers of the Progressive era. While these reformers sometimes had links to the academy, mostly they were self-styled civic activists. Some were employed by nonprofit municipal research bureaus or efficiency bureaus; others were private citizens opting to dedicate their discretionary time to such goals. The other progenitor of the discipline was political science. Most early academics, beginning with Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow, came from political science departments. Like other aspects of the history of American public administration, the study of government public relations can be traced to these two ancestors.

Ancestry of Public Relations in Public Administration: Reformers and Practitioners

Good government reformers in the Progressive era (1890-1920) quickly grasped the importance of using publicity to inform the citizenry on public affairs. Publicity could trigger public pressure...
on politicians to adopt the reforms these Progressives were advocating. Publicity became a central tenet of the good government movement, assuming positive and extensive coverage from some of the city’s daily newspapers. These reformers, men and women, were outside government, usually affiliated with nonprofit civic and advocacy organizations (Straughan, 2007).

One of the earliest publications by a reformer documenting examples of the powerful impact of publicity occurred in Harrisburg (PA) beginning in 1902 (McFarland, 1906). The use of publicity to promote reform was then refined and institutionalized by William Allen, a researcher and good government reformer in New York City in the first decade of the 20th century. In 1907, he teamed up with fellow civic activists Henry Bruère and Frederick Cleveland to found the nonprofit New York Bureau of Municipal Research (BMR). However, in 1914 John D. Rockefeller, Sr. agreed to fund the bureau, but only if it shifted from its adversarial and publicity orientation to a noncontroversial and behind-the-scenes operating style. Going for the money, Allen was out. Nonetheless, by then, the importance of publicity had seeped deep into the reformers’ modus vivendi (Schachter, 1997).

It was only a short step from recognizing the importance of publicity to impose government reforms from the outside to seeing the usefulness of publicity to reformers inside government. For example, in 1908, a staffer from the New York BMR wrote that “it is apparently the last thing to occur to many public officials, when they are in need for support for their policies, to go directly to the public and ask for what they want” (Miles, 1908, 208). In 1912, the Milwaukee city government’s Bureau of Economy and Efficiency released a study of the municipal public health department. It urged the department to increase its focus on dissemination of publications as an effective way to promote what would now be called wellness among the citizenry. According to the report, authorities “cannot hope to secure the best results, however efficiently they may do their work, unless they have the good will and cooperation of the people” (Gunn and Luening, 1912, 3). One of the papers at the National Municipal League’s (NML) 1917 annual conference was by the Director of Public Welfare of Dayton’s (OH) municipal government on “Humanizing Welfare Reports” (Snyder, 1918). The next year, NML’s Secretary summarized the state of the field by noting “Democracy demands publicity” and that municipal officials should make more of an effort to publicize the work of their departments (Woodruff, 1919, 7).

In 1927, Professor Leonard White of the University of Chicago summarized the value of publicity in his handbook for city managers. He stated the now-conventional wisdom that a city manager should view public relations as an distinct aspect of his duties (at the time they were all men), including dealing with the press, giving public talks, issuing public reports and being in contact with nonprofit civic organizations (White, 1971, 210-26).

Ancestry of Public Relations in Public Administration: Political Science

As an offspring of political science, it is difficult to pinpoint precisely when public administration first became interested in public relations. Woodrow Wilson’s landmark article referred to the
importance of public opinion, but mostly in the context of administrators needing to be sensitive to public opinion between elections (Wilson, 1941, 499). The book that is considered the founding of the field of modern study of public opinion was Walter Lippmann’s 1922 *Public Opinion* (1997). (However, Lippmann was not in the academy.) Political science quickly picked up on the subject, broadening attention from empirical studies of public opinion to propaganda efforts to influence it. Harold Lasswell, at the University of Chicago, was one of the earliest political scientists interested in propaganda (1972).

It appears that the first political scientist significantly interested in public relations in public administration was Harvard’s Pendleton Herring. He had written his dissertation at Johns Hopkins in 1928 on interest group lobbying of Congress (Herring, 1967 [1928]). At the beginning of Franklin Roosevelt’s first term, Herring’s interest in lobbying expanded to a newer phenomenon, pressures on Congress from executive branch agencies. After FDR’s inauguration in March 1933, the use of professional public relations officers by many of the early New Deal alphabet agencies greatly expanded compared to previous practice. Herring thought this was a relatively new form and source of pressuring Congress.

In December 1934, Herring convened and chaired at the American Political Science Association’s (APSA) annual conference a panel on “Public Relations of National Administrative Agencies.” It was a mix of academics and practitioners, the former included John Gaus (University of Wisconsin [Madison]) and Marshall Dimock (University of Chicago) and the latter category included Louis Brownlow (Ogg, 1935, 109). That same month, Herring published his first writing on the subject. He observed that the New Deal seemed to be upsetting Congressional domination of departments and agencies in the executive branch. One of the reasons, he suggested, was that a federal bureau “can coerce the legislators through its power of propaganda. The procurement of apparent popular support through skillfully conducted publicity may so fortify its position that Congress would hesitate to abolish the bureau or reduce its appropriation” (1934, 191). Herring expanded on that theme in an article the next year in the *Annals* (1935) and then as a chapter in his 1936 book *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (1967).

Like Herring, APSA panelist Dimock had also published a piece on external communications in public administration in 1934, but the venue was a non-refereed journal, *National Municipal Review (NMR)*, NML’s monthly publication (Dimock, 1934). Even before Herring and Dimock, Clarence Ridley, who had academic credentials (a PhD from Syracuse University), published an article about one aspect of government public relations. But his orientation was towards practitioners, specifically trying to nurture the new profession of city management. In 1927 he published an article on municipal public reporting, but it, too, was in *NMR* (Ridley, 1927). Therefore, the nod goes to Herring as the first academic to publish in a refereed journal a discussion of public relations in public administration.

By the time Herring published the first truly academic piece in 1934, the topic was already old hat to civic reformers (outside government) and municipal practitioners. However, it is signifi-
cant that Herring and his colleagues were largely focusing on the national government while those outside the professoriate, whether good government reformers or practitioners, were almost exclusively interested in municipal government. So, these two clusters of early interest in government public relations were like ships passing in the night. Despite their sequential chronology, there appeared to be little overlap or cross-fertilization between them.

Public Reporting and Publicity: Beyle and McCamy Subdivide the New Field into Democratic vs. Pragmatic Public Relations

The rubric of public relations in public administration quickly split into two relatively discrete topics. One was called public reporting and focused on the general obligation of public servants to contribute to an informed public, the sine qua non of democracy. This was a focus on communication for information sake, with no motive other than promoting the workings of democracy. This topic was very much a reflection of the “public” in public administration. Senior government managers were being inculcated about their accountability to the public and their obligation to circulate facts that would be helpful to public opinion. Such an obligation, of course, did not exist in the counterpart field of business administration. Here was an element of management that highlighted the differences between the public and private sectors.

The other subtopic of government public relations was one based on the pragmatic needs of public administrators. In this context, effective communications strategies could help an agency accomplish its substantive goals, such as notifying specific population categories of a new program that they could benefit from, using publicity as a way to encourage compliance with laws rather than relying on an enforcement strategy (“Only you can prevent forest fires”), or obtaining the cooperation of the citizenry to serve as the eyes and ears of an agency (such as the 911 system). This was a focus on the “administration” in public administration, namely the benefits of public relations in executing agency programs.

(Note the distinction between the study of external communications by public administration versus a political science focus on political communication in campaigns and by elected officials.)

The division of the study of government public relations into the two distinct foci, democratic purposes versus pragmatic ones, was gradually identified and formalized by two seminal academic research studies in 1928 and 1939. Herman C. Beyle’s *Governmental Reporting in Chicago* (1928) was the first major academic investigation of public reporting and became the founding document for the subfield of democratic public relations within the larger academic rubric of government public relations. Then, in 1939, James L. McCamy’s *Government Publicity* was the first academic study of pragmatic public relations in public administration and is considered the original book for that subfield. (Note on Style: To avoid duplication, references to publications by Beyle and McCamy can be found in the two bibliographic appendices and are not repeated in the References section.)

While the two books were on separate aspects of public relations, both of them used “government”
in their titles. Strictly speaking, Beyle’s was a study of reporting by local governments in the Chicago area. So, he could have titled the book “Municipal Reporting” or “Local Public Reporting.” Similarly, McCamy’s volume was limited to the federal government, so it could have been called “Federal Publicity.” That both of them used the broader term “government” is an indication of their vision that they were studying phenomena that were prevalent throughout the public sector in the US, at all levels of government. They were laying the groundwork for subsequent academic attention to the generic topics of reporting and publicity, rather than activities limited to one level of government. This catholicity is a contributing factor to the influence their books had on public administration, with the scope of attention extending to all aspects and levels of government.

Beyle’s and McCamy’s research are being deemed here as the founding documents of the academic study of public reporting and publicity for four reasons, none met by earlier publications on the topic (some cited above). First, each was a book-length investigation of the topic. Second, the research was conducted with an academic orientation, with both projects being the authors’ dissertations. Third, each volume was a comprehensive and modern study, using social science and empirical research techniques, rather than the literature that preceded it, all largely normative, institutional, descriptive or practitioner-oriented. They used some basic, but rigorous, quantitative measurement and research techniques. Finally, both studies were published by a university press (in this case both by University of Chicago Press), giving a further academic imprimatur to their two works.

It was no coincidence that both books were authored by doctoral candidates in political science at the University of Chicago and that both were published by its Press. At the time, the University of Chicago’s political science department was something of a hotbed of academics who were reforming the discipline to include public administration and, further, that they wanted public administration to be relevant to the real world. Perhaps the most prominent of this impressive group was Charles E. Merriam, who was elected to Chicago’s City Council as an alderman and used that platform to become acquainted with the inner workings of government as well as to push for reforms he hatched in the ivory tower (Lee, 2008, 95-96, 117-18). (He later served on the Brownlow Committee, with Luther Gulick as the third member.) Merriam’s colleagues included some already mentioned, such as Leonard White and Harold Lasswell. Another was Harold Gosnell, who – while more interested on the electoral side of government – was a pioneer in using innovative empirical methodologies. (A section of the American Political Science Association now has an annual Gosnell Prize for best work in political methodology.) Collectively, they encouraged their doctoral candidates to focus on studying the reality of modern government, using social science methodologies then beginning to blossom within the discipline. Tellingly, McCamy described “the stimulating and intellectually adventurous faculty” in the department who were interested in public affairs (1939, ix).

Beyle and McCamy did not overlap as graduate students, but they certainly knew each other later in their careers. For example, in 1940 (a year after McCamy’s book was published), the new American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) held its second annual meeting to coincide...
with APSA’s 36th annual conference. McCamy chaired a two-session panel on “Public Reporting” that was jointly sponsored by APSA and ASPA. At the first session, Beyle read a paper on “Research in Attitudes as Related to Public Reporting” and at the second (two days later), on “Techniques Determining Emotional Factors” (Colegrove, 1941, 122, 131) (Another panelist presenting different papers at the two sessions was Rensis Likert, then with the Program Surveys Division of USDA’s Bureau of Agricultural Economics.)

**Governmental Reporting in Chicago: Herman Beyle Inaugurates the Academic Study of Public Reporting**

Professor Merriam encouraged Beyle to focus on public reporting for his dissertation. From Merriam’s perspective, this was an important topic, going so far as stating, “No field is more important to the electors who seek information on the working of their government.” The problem, Merriam felt, was that, notwithstanding the topic’s importance, it “may be called a jungle through which run only a few trails, and some of those are little used” (1929, ix). He was referring to the emerging normative consensus that public reporting was one way to harmonize professionalization of municipal management with democracy. Several academics were calling for systematic public reporting, such as Harvard’s William Bennett Munro (1916, 7-9), as well as non-academically based reformers, such as Bruère at the New York BMR (1916, chap. 6) and Cook (1919, chap. 7). However, virtually no one had delved in depth or detail into what municipalities were currently doing, drawing generalizations from current practice, and then developing “best practices” recommendations that were empirically, rather than normatively, based.

Merriam pushed Beyle to study the topic dispassionately and comprehensively by collecting and reviewing all annual reports issued by every governmental body operating in whole or in part in the City of Chicago for 1923. Beyle eventually accumulated a shelf of publications that was more than five feet long. The 412-page dissertation was approved in September, 1926. The book, with virtually no change from the dissertation, was prepared for publication during 1927 (the date of the acknowledgements section is October 1, 1927) when Beyle had already taken his first position at the University of Minnesota. It was published by University of Chicago Press in June 1928 as part of its series on Social Science Studies sponsored by the University’s inter-departmental Local Community Research Committee (Bulmer, 1980).

The book (and dissertation) presented a methodical review of all the Chicago-area reports he was able to locate. However, about half the local government bodies did not issue annual public reports. To provide context for his investigation, he compared the reports to counterpart ones from Boston, London, Paris and Berlin. The book had the standard structure of such a project. It began with an overview of the importance of the subject, including a review of the (scant) literature, the scope of the study and the methodology of the inquiry. In the body of the book, Beyle divided public reporting into segments. First, he reviewed the process, including the reporting systems in place, and then the sequential steps of preparation, submission, publication, and distribution. Second, he reviewed the contents of the reports, followed by a study of the data contained in the re-
ports and, finally, of the methods of presentation in the reports. Following the conventional academic formula, the book ended with a chapter presenting a summary and conclusions, including identification of further subjects for research. The final chapter included a proposed list of tentative principles of “good reporting practice.” (That’s also a reminder that the term “best practices” was invented long before it made a comeback in the 1990s.) The book concluded with two appendices, a bibliography and an index.

The same year the book was published, Luther Gulick reviewed it in APSA’s *American Political Science Review (APSR)*. While it was a mixed review, his positive comments indicate the book’s thoroughness and what contributed to its later landmark status: “The great strength of this book lies in the tireless ingenuity which has been applied to the study of 60,000 pages of Chicago's public reporting. … The author has taken too many fine strokes with a monster brush, but he has finished one task that no one will ever have to tackle again” (1928, 997, emphasis added). Gulick’s lukewarm reaction to *Governmental Reporting* was somewhat puzzling. In his famous 1936 eight-lettered acronym POSDCORB, the “R” was for reporting, indicating its importance as a management activity. Reporting meant “keeping those to whom the executive is responsible informed as to what is going on” (Gulick, 1987, 13).

While not a review, half a decade after Beyle’s book was published, Professor Roscoe Martin wrote that it “was the pioneer study in this field, [and] remains one of the most useful books available on the problem” (1934, 103n1).

**After Governmental Reporting**

A short summary of Beyle’s subsequent academic career relating to public reporting has been presented elsewhere (Lee, 2006, 252-54). As an indication of the instant credibility he received due to the book, just a year after it was published and while still a junior professor, he was named as one of eight members of the National Committee on Public Reporting. The Committee was a prestigious project sponsored by four of the most important good government and public administration practitioner groups at the time: NML, ICMA, the Governmental Research Association and the American Municipal League (later the National League of Cities).

Beyle gradually conceptualized public reporting as two-way communication. Using baseball terms, he suggested that the topic covered both “pitching” (i.e. releasing reports) and “catching” (receiving feedback from the public after the reports were released). That, in turn, got him increasingly interested in survey research, public opinion polling and other increasingly sophisticated quantitative methodologies. His last publication devoted principally to public reporting, as opposed to in passing, was in 1939. (See Appendix A for a bibliography of Beyle’s writings on public reporting.)

Even though he was losing an active interest in public reporting, Beyle continued being involved in the subject. By now at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, he was recruited by Dean William Mosher to help on a 1941 investigation into public relations of public personnel agen-
cies. He designed a questionnaire to measure citizen feedback on reports from civil service systems to be used with New York City and Cincinnati residents, and to visitors at the 1939 World’s Fair in New York. In 1947, Beyle gave a talk on “Public Administration and Public Relations” to the chapter of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) in Albany, the state capital (News, 1947, 219). He stayed at Syracuse University for the rest of his career, teaching there for 28 years. He died of a heart attack at age 64 in 1956.

Post-Beyle and through to the mid-1950s, the most important writers about public reporting were Clarence Ridley and, later, his protégé Herbert Simon (Lee, 2003; 2006). In part, their work was a continuation of Beyle’s, emphasizing the centrality of reporting to public administration and the need for comprehensive reporting templates. An overt linkage between them occurred in the late 1930s. Ridley sent twenty-something Simon to Syracuse to meet with Professors “Henry [sic] Beyle” and Spencer Parrott who, Simon wrote in his memoirs, “were approaching the topic of municipal measurement from a somewhat different angle than ours, and who wanted to discuss the relation f the two approaches” (Simon, 1996, 65). Ridley and Simon parted company with Beyle in several major ways. They were interested in reporting only as a final product of their major concentration on municipal performance measurement, they were practitioner oriented and – regarding reporting – they were largely normative in focus, seeking to convince city managers and municipalities that this was a good and important thing to do.

While public reporting gradually faded from the agenda of academic public administration (along with the larger rubric of public relations), Beyle’s book continued to be cited. This is an indicator of its status as a definitive and lasting contribution to the literature. Some recent citations (in reverse chronological order) include Lee (2006), Williams (2003) and Pinderhughes (1987). Some other recent writings about reporting did not cite Beyle, but their publication demonstrated some academic and practitioner attention to government reporting. For example, in 2007, two Australian academics published a study of public sector annual reports. They documented a reemerging vitality of the practice of government reporting in their country (Mack and Ryan, 2007). That same year, a professional association of Canadian accountants issued a how-to study guide to promote effective public performance reporting by government agencies (Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation, 2007). In 2008, the 2nd edition of the Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy included a new entry on popular reporting, a topic that had not been covered in the original 2003 version (Clay, 2008).

The lasting value of Governmental Reporting is its comprehensive and disinterested perspective. Looking back 80 years after it was published, it currently reads as more than an historical artifact of Chicago area reports in 1923. But, Beyle’s systematic review of the process and contents of public reporting and then contextualization by using reports from other major cities in and out of the US, all contribute to a sense of detailed scholarship rather than normative exhortations. By the time he concluded the book with his “tentative” best practices, he had achieved credibility to venture in that direction. Those recommendations are, largely, applicable to the early 21st century as much as to the 1920s.
Government Publicity: James McCamy Inaugurates the Academic Study of Publicity in Public Administration

When McCamy arrived at the University of Chicago in 1932 for his doctoral studies in political science, he had already demonstrated an interest in government public relations. His master’s thesis at the University of Texas (Austin), approved in 1932, was on “Governmental Reporting in Texas State Administration.” He, of course, cited Beyle in it (p. 5). By now, another luminary in the department was Marshall Dimock, who had arrived in 1933. He was McCamy’s dissertation adviser at Chicago. It will be recalled that in 1934 Dimock published an article in NMR, declaring in its opening sentence that “The most neglected aspect of public administration is salesmanship – what is usually called, in the broader sense, public relations” (1934, 660). Lasswell was also a dissertation adviser.

By the mid-1930s, other authors were following up on Herring’s and Dimock’s earlier cited writings. In particular, the founding of Public Opinion Quarterly provided an outlet for discussions about government public relations. Its first issue was published in January 1937. At that time, POQ did not have the focus on highly quantified survey research that it later evolved into. Rather, both practitioners and academics contributed articles on various aspects of public opinion, including the relatively new phenomenon of public relations activities of federal agencies. Harold Lasswell (then still at Chicago) was POQ’s associate editor, in charge of the section of each issue relating to governmental topics. The first issue contained an article by ICMA head Ridley on “Municipal Reporting Taken Seriously.” Subsequent issues in early years contained articles on government public relations by New York Times reporter and columnist Arthur Krock, by a senior PR man in a federal agency and by a staffer at the Library of Congress. Volume 4 included a repeating section called “Who’s Who in Federal Publicity.”

However, as in Beyle’s case, the topic of government publicity was still in its infancy with no other academic books on the subject. McCamy, like Beyle, was virtually inventing a new field of study. McCamy researched his dissertation mostly in 1937 and early 1938. Years later, he reminisced about how much “fun” he had working on his dissertation: “I felt that I was making discoveries, and I was. I was discovering not only the large and unknown apparatus for propaganda, but also the theory, new also, of propaganda in man’s communication.” His main regret, he told this author nearly 35 years later, was that “the military was so insignificant as propagandist that I barely mentioned it” (letter to the author, July 30, 1971, author’s files). McCamy’s 291-page dissertation “Federal Administrative Publicity” was approved in August 1938 and then – with almost no changes – quickly moved to publication by the University of Chicago Press, with the slightly revised title Government Publicity: Its Practice in Federal Administration. McCamy cited Beyle in his dissertation (p. 16) and book (p. 15), further reflecting the close linkage of their path breaking publications. Even though Government Publicity was not released until June 1939, the date of the Preface is November 15, 1938. By then, McCamy had moved to Vermont to join the faculty at Bennington University. While nothing in the book identifies it formally as part of a series, the Press advertised McCamy’s book in the first issue of Public Administration Review as part of

The book (and dissertation) presented a methodical review of the practice of public relations at that time by federal executive branch agencies, some old line Cabinet departments, others created by Roosevelt. Like Beyle’s book, McCamy’s had the standard structure of such a project. It began with an overview of the importance of the subject, including a review of the (scant) literature, the scope of the study and the methodology of the inquiry. In the body of the book, McCamy sub-divided the practice of government publicity into segments, each of which was the topic of a chapter. He created categories other than the obvious and pedestrian silo approach of dedicating a chapter to each major department or agency. That would merely have presented a compendium of vertical case studies, essentially a descriptive approach. Rather, he organized the subject horizontally, presenting empirical research results based on patterns of practice he found across-the-board in executive branch departments and agencies. The categories he created covered methods of communication, methods of distribution, quantitative analysis, coordination, and staffing.

McCamy also developed a theoretical framework on the purposes of government public relations, including Beyle’s focus on democracy-driven external communications (1939, 21):

1. distribute publicity among or for the clients of the agency;
2. catch and hold the attention of the large public;
3. influence legislation;
4. reply to attacks upon the agency;
5. avoid publicity;
6. report, without particular aims, the routine news of government.

To collect this information, McCamy created a questionnaire and surveyed the publicity activities of all but the most minor agencies. He also conducted in-depth interviews with major PR practitioners in the federal government. Another methodology he used was content analysis. He analyzed newspaper coverage, seeking to identify how much of a story emanated from an agency’s press release and how closely the story tracked the orientation of the release. (Lasswell was a major proponent of content analysis as a methodology.) Using these empirical and social science research techniques he collected original, comprehensive and in-depth data.

Again, like Beyle, McCamy followed the standard academic template of ending the book with a summary and conclusions from the inquiry. Then, being careful, he separated the conclusions chapter from a final chapter providing his views on the implications of his study. He suggested that government public relations was not a threat to democracy or the free press and was not inherently a reflection of dictatorship. (This was in the context of the propaganda activities of the Nazis in Germany and the Fascists in Italy; as well as accusations by the conservative coalition in Congress that Roosevelt’s 1937 reorganization proposal would be tantamount to a dictatorship.) McCamy viewed government PR with equanimity, as a benign extension of modern pub-
lic administration, emerging as integral to the administrative process. Public relations was more than self-serving publicity by an agency (and there was some of that) or Beyle style reporting. Rather, publicity activities were an inherent element of administrative leadership.

The initial reviews of the book were very positive and hinted at what its lasting contribution would be. The first review, in 1939, was in *APSR*. Wengert, who had written his 1936 (unpublished) dissertation on a narrower aspect of federal public relations (under John Gaus at Wisconsin), gave it a very favorable review. He saw the book as an antidote “To the emotional and frequently uninformed critics of the government publicist.” Given the political and journalistic attacks on public relations activities of executive branch agencies in FDR’s administration, “McCamy’s revaluation [sic] of the publicity function is thus also a contribution to such understanding as will permit its protection against stupid suspicions and attacks” (Wengert, 1939). A more detailed review in *POQ* noted that government propaganda was much in discussion, “but upon which few facts are known. The author has made a noteworthy contribution in widening the field of information on this subject” (Rohlfing, 1940, 365). Finally, Harwood Childs, a Princeton political scientist who was first editor of *POQ* and a leading expert on propaganda and public opinion, gave McCamy’s book a very favorable review in the *Annals*. He described it as “the most complete factual survey to date” and “about the only and certainly the best treatment of the subject of government publicity now available” (1940).

**After Government Publicity**

By the time the book was released, McCamy had left Bennington and spent WWII as a federal administrator, first as an assistant to Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace (later Vice President during FDR’s third term) and then with several wartime and post-war federal programs dealing with international economic policy (McCamy, 1952, viii). He joined the political science faculty at University of Wisconsin (Madison) in 1947 and taught public administration and other subjects there until he retired in 1971. Initially, he maintained his interest in government publicity (see Appendix B). Gradually, his major interests shifted to foreign policy, then to science policy. His last book, published in 1972, was an extension of the latter subject, dealing with environmental studies, then a new topic in the academy. He died in 1995 at age 89.

*Government Publicity*, while long out of print, continued to be a touchstone reference as the definitive treatment of the subject. Its status was confirmed 40 years later when Martin included it in his *Guide to the Foundations of Public Administration* (emphasis added) in the chapter on “Press and Interest Group Relations” (1989, 150). *Government Publicity* continued to be cited frequently by academic authors in public administration and other closely related subjects. Some recent examples include (in reverse chronological order) Cone (2007), Kosar (2005), Baskind (2004), Rose (2000), Craig (2000), Dunn and Legge (2000), Bird (1999) and Winfield (1994).

The lasting value of *Government Publicity* derives from what it accomplished. McCamy’s was the first book-length treatment of an emerging and relatively new subfield within public administra-
tion. In that sense, he pioneered the subject by defining it comprehensively and then measuring it quantitatively. He presented first-time data on public relations practices and demonstrated that the subject could be researched using credible and basic social science methodology. A subject that had been largely under attack by political and journalistic hysteria, he was the first to ground it with a reality check. The facts simply didn’t support the purported manipulative power asserted about government public relations. Finally, McCamy showed that external communications was an inherent element of modern public administration, not an ancillary appendage.

From Then, Till Now: Summary and Conclusions

In retrospect, the breakthroughs that Beyle and McCamy accomplished were based on a trend that was not apparent to most until decades later, namely that communication of information was the basis not only of understanding how modern society and government function. Theirs was an extraordinary insight, presaging the information age and the communication revolution. Public reporting was an act of conveying information to external audiences that had the purpose of improving the democratic process. Meanwhile, government publicity entailed communicating to the public information that would improve the delivery of governmental goods and services.

Partly as a result of the impact and influence of Beyle’s and McCamy’s landmark books, public administration briefly treated public relations as one of its important subdivisions of the field. Through the middle of the 20th century, the major textbooks all contained relatively extended discussions of the topic (Lee, 1998). Then the subfield gradually faded from attention. When Waldo assessed the status of external (and internal) communications in public administration in 1992, he concluded it was “a significant but neglected topic” (Waldo, 1992, xi). It might not be so much that it disappeared, but rather that its component parts found new homes in a kind of public administration diaspora. The table seeks to correlate McCamy’s 1939 typology of government public relations with more contemporary terminology and nomenclature.

Now, however, there are straws in the wind that government public relations, as a subfield of public administration, may be re-congealing and the topic gaining a greater profile in the discipline. According to Holden, “The potential interconnection between public opinion and the success of public administration is one of the most profound realities to which political science may yet direct new attention” (1996, 35). Some recent publications relevant to government public relations have included (in reverse chronological order) Piotrowski (2007), Liu and Horsley (2007), Fairbanks et al. (2007), Roberts (2006), Raphael and Nesbary (2005), Graber (2003), Weiss (2002), and Garnett and Kouzmin (1997).

This would be a timely development given the dominant role of communications, the news media and information technologies in 21st century life, society and governance. A current day sensibility regarding government public relations for democratic purposes (and topics to study) would include e-reporting (i.e. using new technologies to report directly to public instead of indirectly
### McCamy’s Typology of Government Public Relations and Contemporary Nomenclature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>McCamy’s Purposes of Government Public Relations</strong></th>
<th><strong>Contemporary and Related Rubrics</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>distribute publicity among or for the clients of the agency</td>
<td>marketing, client relations, quality service, G2C (government to citizen) e-government, advertising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>catch and hold the attention of the large public</td>
<td>public opinion, survey research, public service campaigns, political communications, autonomy seeking (Carpenter, 2001), American political development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence legislation</td>
<td>legislative relations, Congressional studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reply to attacks upon the agency</td>
<td>bureaucratic politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avoid publicity</td>
<td>secrecy, freedom of information, sunshine laws, transparency, executive privilege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>report, without particular aims, the routine news of government</td>
<td>popular reporting, media relations, e-democracy, e-reporting, accountability, performance measurement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

through the news media), appointment of a “Chief Democracy Officer” in large agencies comparable to CIOs and CFOs, and maintenance of governmental e-news sites comparable to websites maintained by daily newspapers (Lee, 2005; 2007). Some of the pragmatic uses of modern public administration deserving academic study include sophisticated media relations by bureaucracies, crisis communications and use of paid advertising.

If such a renewed interest in the subject proves to be the case, then it would give new life to the pioneering work of the two founders of the subfield of government public relations, Herman Beyle and James McCamy and their seminal books.
Appendix A

Bibliography of Herman Beyle’s Writings on Public Reporting (in chronological order)


National Committee on Municipal Reporting, *Public Reporting: With Special Reference to Annual, Departmental, and Current Reports of Municipalities*, Publication No. 19. (New York: Municipal Administration Service, 1931). [Beyle was one of eight Committee members.]


“Governmental Reporting and Public Relations,” mimeograph typescript (42 pp.), 1938 (?), Syracuse University Archives. [Beyle’s summary: “Since this chapter is used by the author as a point of departure for a series of class discussions on Governmental Reporting and Public Relations, this list of suggestions may be considered as a brief expository syllabus” {p. 35n49}.]

*Public Opinion and Government*, teaching manual, mimeograph (?), 1938 (?). Contains at least 43 chapters. [This manuscript was not located.]

“Reporting – A Two Way Street,” *Public Administration Review* 2:2 (February 1939) 16-18. [This journal was briefly published by Syracuse University’s Public Administration Alumni Association. After it ceased publication, the newly created ASPA revived the title for its refereed journal.]

Sections on to public reporting (especially Appendices B and E), in William E. Mosher (chairman), *Public Relations of Public Personnel Agencies: A Report Submitted to the Civil Service Assembly by the Committee on Public Relations of Public Personnel Agencies* (Chicago: Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada, 1941). [Mosher stated that Beyle “prepared special sections of the report” {p. xi}.]

“The Responsible Citizen in Democratic Governance” (chap. 9), in Our Ways of Governance (Endicott, NY: Citizenship and Political Science Staff of Triple Cities College, 1948). [This is a revised version of the 1941 book/curriculum, but Beyle was the sole author.]

Appendix B

Bibliography of James McCamy’s Writings on Government Publicity (in chronological order)

“Governmental Reporting in Texas State Administration,” master's thesis in political science, University of Texas (Austin), 1932, unpublished.


Section on public opinion and administrative publicity in “We Need More Personalized Administration,” in Felix A. Nigro (ed.), Public Administration Readings and Documents (New York: Rinehart, 1951) 474-77.


“Government Publicity, 1972” (guest lecture), Syracuse University, October 11, 1972. Unpublished, author’s files.

**References (other than Beyle and McCamy)**


Founders of the Study of Public Relations in Public Administration


**Dr. Mordecai Lee** is Professor of Governmental Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. James McCamy was Lee’s political science advisor during Lee’s senior year at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (1969-70). Following in McCamy’s academic footsteps, Lee authored *The First Presidential Communications Agency: FDR’s Office of Government Reports* (2005) and edited *Government Public Relations: A Reader* (2008).
Any consideration of the founding of public administration would be incomplete without the inclusion of Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933), one of the great figures in the history of the discipline. An important political and social theorist, Follett’s first book focused on the leadership of the House of Representatives (Follett, 1896), followed by analyses of citizenship, community, and nation (Follett, 1918, 1919, 1924). In addition to that scholarly work, Follett was for decades deeply involved with the community centres movement, innovations in education, and the creation of employment bureaus to place young women and men in the workforce (Metcalf & Urwick, 1941a; Urwick & Brech, 1951). Later she became a lecturer, writer, and consultant on organizations and management (Follett, 1949; Fox & Urwick, 1973b; Metcalf & Urwick, 1941b; Tonn, 2003), activities that took up the latter part of her professional life.

As a founding contributor to the modern science of administration, whether public or private, however, Mary Parker Follett poses quite a challenge to those who study her work. A few of her major concepts regularly appear in textbooks: the law of the situation, power-with versus power-over, and depersonalization of orders, for example. Similarly, her lectures on “Constructive Conflict” (Follett, 1926a), “The Giving of Orders” (Follett, 1926b), and “Power” (Follett, 1926c) are often recycled through collections of readings on public administration or organizational behavior. Those concepts and lectures are, however, equally applicable to the public and private sectors.

Only a single paper, her final 1932 lecture at the London School of Economics, has become established as part of the canon of public administration literature. That paper, “The Process of Control” (Follett, 1937), gives Follett the unique status of being the only woman to have her work included in Papers on the Science of Administration (Gulick & Urwick, 1937), the set of materials assembled for the President’s Committee on Administrative Management (also known as the Brownlow Committee). Her gender went unnoticed, however, for in his foreword Luther Gulick (1937) wrote “The papers brought together in this collection are essays by men scientifically interested in the phenomena of administration” (p. v).
“The Process of Control” and Follett’s other lectures at the London School of Economics were to a considerable degree already part of Follett’s past. They were largely restatements of positions that she had worked out much earlier and had published in various proceedings of the Bureau of Personnel Administration Conferences (Metcalf, 1926, 1927a, 1927b, 1931). At the time of her death in 1933 she had turned away from lecturing and consulting on organization and management to focus once again on political theory, international relations, and the League of Nations (Tonn, 2003). With this turn to international relations Follett brought to full circle her studies of political and social institutions, the ways in which citizens’ ability to affect societal decision-making could be broadened and deepened, and the ways in which the citizen-worker could be empowered in the workplace. Her books, lectures, and collected papers are especially important in that all of them address the “ageless question of the relations of human beings to each other in the institutions which they develop” (Urwick, 1949, p. xi). As such, her scholarly work is equally applicable to the public and the private sectors for, as Urwick also noted, “It would never have occurred to her . . . to distinguish between public administration and business management” (p. xi).

Given the great range of these professional accomplishments, any succinct description of Mary Parker Follett is a daunting task. Peter Drucker (2003), one of the great scholars of our time, does as well as perhaps can be done when he categorizes her as being among the “exceptional women” and among of the “stars” of her time (p. 3). The basis for such a description rests not only on the professional accomplishments outlined above but on Follett’s personality and social background as well. Mary Parker Follett came from old New England stock and had the social standing and skills of the upper classes. She received a superb education at Radcliffe and Cambridge University. She operated within a uniquely powerful set of acquaintances and friends, from Supreme Court justices to British cabinet members, business executives to university professors, and she associated with intellectual and cultural elites on both sides of the Atlantic. With such status, with modest wealth on an independent scale, and the ability to travel and study as she wished, she led a life that in her day, as in ours, would be the envy of women and men alike.

This article is not an essay in biography, however. For purposes of the present study the following sections deal only with those aspects of Follett’s life that relate to her development as a scholar and social activist: her education and training as a political scientist; the evolution of her views on science and scientific method; her leadership of the community centres movement; her theory of community; her work as a consultant and lecturer on organization, administration, and management; her place in the history of the social sciences; and her vision for a democratic society.

The Early Years: A Political Scientist in the Making

Follett had the best education available. She got her secondary school education at the prestigious Thayer Academy, enrolling in 1880 (Parker & Ritson, 2005). There she came under the influence of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s philosophy of transcendental idealism through her teacher Anna Boynton Thompson (Parker, 1984), herself a distinguished scholar who had published a book on Fichte (Thompson, 1895). A brilliant student, Follett’s lowest annual grade average at
Thayer was “97.6 of 100” and, of an entering class of twenty-one students, only Follett and seven others were to graduate (Tonn, 2003, pp. 20-21).

From Thayer Academy, Follett went to Harvard or, more precisely, the Harvard “Annex.” Women were not permitted to enroll at Harvard, but the Annex (which later became Radcliffe College) was a place where “women could take courses taught by Harvard professors” (Tonn, 2003, p. 31). Enrolling in 1888, Follett continued the studies that, as one scholar put it, made it possible for her throughout her later life to have “circulated across what we now perceive as distinct and, at times, unbridgeable disciplinary borders: She was at home citing philosophers, psychologists, political theorists, biologists, legal scholars, historians, physiologists, and economists – as well as the Bible” (O’Connor, 2000, p. 167). It was at Harvard, too, that she studied with the distinguished historian Albert Bushnell Hart, a man who not only became her mentor but directed her research on the Speaker of the House of Representatives, was instrumental in getting the work published by the house of Longmans Green, and wrote an Introduction to the book (Tonn, 2003). 4

Hart’s introduction is important in that it demonstrates the prevailing late nineteenth-century attitude toward “scientific” research in history and the social sciences. In that era the conception of science seems to have been that it was merely a matter of collecting enough facts about whatever matter was at hand and drawing some conclusions from them. Facts were objective things as opposed to philosophical judgments, normative statements, or popular speculation. In his study of nineteenth century public administration Nelson (1982) points out that in both the public and private sectors rational decision-making, planning, and policy-making were all hampered by a dearth of data. The obvious solution to the lack of data was to gather it, to engage in neutral, objective fact-collecting. This approach to data collection does not appear to have been set within any theoretical framework; it was instead a rather crude empiricism or “hyperfactualism” (Easton, 1953, pp. 66-78) coupled with an almost naive belief that the accumulated data would lead to solutions reasonably agreed upon by reasonable men. 5 This approach is notable in Taylor’s (1911/1998, 1947) vision of scientific management, Wilson’s (1887) view of the application of business models to public administration, and Goodnow’s (1900, 1911) attempts to bring realism to the study of politics and administration.

The emphasis on facts and objectivity are recurring themes of Hart’s introductory comments. 6 After emphasizing that Follett was a “well-equipped investigator” who had diligently sifted the historical record, conducted what would today be called field research, and interviewed former Speakers, Hart reaches a peroration by asserting that “Upon this basis of carefully ascertained fact the author has based her deductions . . . She has started out with no thesis to prove, and has had no political bias to overcome. Miss Follett appears to have worked in an impartial and scientific spirit to solve a knotty problem in history and practical government” (Introduction to Follett, 1896, p. xiii). 7 Those who read Follett’s later works will surely hear many echoes of Hart’s assessment of his former student as it is reflected in his Introduction, for those later books and lectures are peppered with references to science, the scientific method, and the importance of getting the facts (Follett, 1918, 1924, 1926c, 1927a, 1927b, 1931b). There is one more noteworthy fact about Fol-
lett’s years at the Harvard Annex: Her book *The Speaker of the House of Representatives* was published in 1896, two years *before* she graduated *summa cum laude* with the class of 1898.8

**Science and Scientific Method: Follett’s Later View**

In its most extreme form social scientists’ fixation on science *qua* physical science has been called “scientism” (Guy, 2003, p. 648) or, as Freudian wags have put it, “physics envy” (Hirschman, 1991, p. 155; Sewell, 2005, pp. 15-16). An early example can be found in the work of one of modern behaviorism’s founders, Arthur Bentley.9 As he saw it, it was “impossible to attain scientific treatment of material that will not submit itself to measurement in some form. Measure conquers chaos” (Bentley, 1908, p. 200), and he dismissed as having no scientific utility such ideas as emotions and feelings, because “feeling elements, stated for themselves, are unmeasurable . . . This is a fatal defect in them. Any pretense of measuring them, no matter with what elaborate algebra, will prove to be merely an attribution to them of powers inferred from their results” (p. 201).10

While this narrow nineteenth century Newtonian vision of science and scientific method shaped Follett’s (1896) study of the *Speaker of the House of Representatives*, it was a vision that she later abandoned. Her decades of work in the education of young adults, placement of workers, wage controversies, women’s conditions of work, and the community centres movement exposed her to a wide range of social realities far removed from those of her Radcliffe and Newnham College classmates as well as those of the social, political, and cultural elites with whom she associated. These experiences among the working classes gave Follett a firm foundation for a new understanding of science and scientific research, one that went far beyond her earlier factual-analytical approach, was more sophisticated than mere scientism, and was advocated by her as the appropriate method of organizational and administrative research in her lectures to the Bureau of Personnel Administration (BPA).

In one of those early lectures to the BPA Conferences, Follett used as her topic the question of what path was to be followed by business management “in order to possess the essentials of a profession?” (Follett, 1927a, p. 73). Her answer to the question was framed by “Recognizing that business management is every day coming more and more to rest on scientific foundations,” by recognizing, as well, that the scientific approach was not universally accepted or appreciated, and by suggesting a particular definition of science as showing the way forward: “Science has been defined as ‘knowledge gained by systematic observation, experiment and reasoning; knowledge coordinated, arranged and systematized’” (p. 79). She then asks two questions: “Can we not accumulate in regard to human relations knowledge gained by systematic observation, experiment and reasoning? Can we not coordinate, arrange, and systematize that knowledge? I think we can” (p. 79). It is this emphasis on systematic observation, experiment, and reasoning that lies at the heart of Follett’s analyses of power, empowerment, and democracy in organizational life (Follett, 1949; Fox & Urwick, 1973b; Metcalf & Urwick, 1941b) and in politics (Follett, 1918, 1924).11 It is an understanding that grew, over many years, from her practical experience in founding, developing, and leading the community centres movement.
The Community Centres Movement: Experience as a Basis for Theory

Follett had interrupted her Harvard studies by spending the 1890-91 year in England at Newnham College, the second of Cambridge University’s colleges to admit women. There she was much influenced by the college’s co-founder Henry Sidgwick, a leading utilitarian philosopher, and by Thomas Hill Green, a member of the English school of Idealism (Tonn, 2003). She was also influenced by the political pluralism of John Neville Figgis, G. D. H. Cole, and Harold J. Laski (Hirst, 1989b; Magid, 1941; Nicholls, 1974, 1994; Runciman, 1997), a school of philosophy to which she later devoted several densely argued chapters of The New State (1918). These English philosophers were not isolated in ivory towers, however. Indeed, they saw philosophy as providing grounds for practical social action. One such area of social action was adult education, and Thomas Hill Green, whose work had a “profound influence on Follett” (Tonn, 2003, p. 298), was among those who provided enthusiastic support for education among the working classes (Barker, 1915, p. 31). Another of Follett’s friends, Richard Burdon Haldane, a distinguished statesman-philosopher (and one who wrote an Introduction to the post-war reissue of The New State), also played a leading role in British adult education programs.

Adult education was not, however, the sole focus of the life and work of these philosophers. Their emphasis on social action for the improvement of British society (Barker, 1915) paralleled those developments in the United States that, in addition to adult education, emphasized social work (Liebmann, 2001), settlement houses (Stillman, 1998; Stivers, 2000), and improving the working and living conditions of industrial workers (Quandt, 1970; Stivers, 2000). To all of these areas Follett would devote decades of her life upon her return to Boston (Mattson, 1998a, 1998b; Metcalf & Urwick, 1941a; Tonn, 2003).

When she returned to the United States, Follett was faced with the limited options available to educated women in her time: marriage, teaching, and social work. There is no known record of romantic attachments. Of the other two options Follett was clearly best prepared, as an intellectual and as a “well-equipped investigator,” in Professor Hart’s apt phrase, for a life of teaching and scholarship. Higher education, however, was dominated by men, and Follett had chosen not to pursue post-graduate degrees. It is therefore unlikely that she considered such a career. She did teach at a private academy for a few years, but her biographer indicates that she found the work unrewarding and soon became disillusioned with the field (Tonn, 2003).

Independent financial means of her own and the support of wealthy friends made it possible for Follett to turn her energies to several aspects of social work. In their three-volume study of scientific management, Urwick and Brech (1951) summarize her motivations in these words: “She had very early become impressed with many of the social evils that followed in the wake of the growing industrialization of the city. She had felt the urge to play her part both in countering the worst effects of these developments and also in seeking a radical cure for the evils themselves” (p. 49). This change of direction gave Follett the opportunity to combine philosophy, rigorous sci-
entific training, and practical action in ways that were very similar to what she had observed amongst her philosopher-activist friends in Britain.

Thus as early as 1900, following Jane Addams’s settlement house model, Follett established a debating club and the Roxbury Neighbourhood House in Boston, the purpose of which was to provide “social, recreational and educational facilities” (Urwick & Brech, 1951, p. 49) for working boys and girls. The ideas that she brought back from Britain, however, required more comprehensive approaches than those provided by the traditional settlement house model. Follett wanted to create special schools, night schools, for young men and women who had gone off to work at an early age. In pursuit of that goal, she founded and led what became known as the schools centres movement. She thus proposed to the local authorities that school buildings should be used after the close of school hours for meetings, lectures, preparation for what we would now call GED and, at a later phase, for the establishment of placement and vocational guidance offices. As a result, from 1909 onward, she served as Chairman of the Committee on the Extended Use of School Buildings (Urwick & Brech, 1951), a position which she used effectively to advance her social and educational programs.

Providing educational and recreational opportunities for young women and men was important, but the nexus between education and employment was as obvious in the early twentieth century as it is now. As a result of her long-standing interest in providing work opportunities for youth, Follett next turned her attention to Boston’s Vocation Bureau as a way to provide “better employment opportunities for those who had to leave school early or were stuck in dead-end jobs” (Strom, 1992, p. 117). Here again Follett was influenced by her experiences in Britain, for she had “observed successful placement programs in London and Edinburgh in 1902” (Fox & Urwick, 1973a, p. xiii). In the years 1912-1917, Follett often worked quietly behind the scenes to develop placement and vocational programs in Boston, achieving success when public funding of the program was provided by the Boston Schools Committee (Strom, 1992, pp. 117-118). The final phase of Follett’s career in social activism was her appointment to the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Board, a board that concerned itself with the appropriate wages to be paid to women workers.

When one reviews the various stages of Follett’s decades of work in Boston, those stages can be seen as cumulative, as being all of a piece: “With each new phase of activity she was being brought more and more closely into contact with industry and industrial problems [and] was able thereby to appreciate more keenly the real emotional and psychological influences that underlay the clash of interest in day-to-day industrial work” (Urwick & Brech, 1951, pp. 49-50). The decades of social activism were also invaluable from a scholarly point of view in that by immersing herself in work with individuals and groups, two words that would play a critical part in all of her social and political philosophy, she was also able to compare and contrast the reality of her practical experience amongst the working classes with the individualist, idealist, and pluralist philosophies that formed so important a part of her education at Harvard and Cambridge.
Translating Experience into Theory: A Radical Pluralism

The practical utility of philosophy is often questioned, and the application of theory to practice is often advocated. In Follett’s case, philosophy provided the foundation for her social activism and her social activism provided the experience upon which she grounded her political theory (Follett, 1918, 1919, 1924). It was from her experiences in the community centres that she worked out an understanding of group dynamics that eventuated in the formal group theory of The New State (1918). The editors of the second edition of her collected papers suggest that, in her own understanding of her work with the community centres, “she was no doubt influenced by the Idealist notion that the individual fulfills his highest nature through membership in society” (Fox & Urwick, 1973a, p. xiv). There were other influences, as well. The near mystical character of some idealist thinking was not inconsistent with the English pluralism (Gehlke, 1924) which Follett had studied so thoroughly. And, given the strong connection between English pluralism and the English church (Coker, 1924), it is not surprising that even in her own day Follett’s position on such matters as the role of individuals and groups in the political system was seen as an almost “spiritual ideal” (Willey, 1924, p. 65).

Nevertheless, The New State is clearly within the pluralist tradition, despite the several chapters that Follett devoted to a vigorous critique of that tradition. Hers was not, however, a theory of formal interest groups, interest group activity, or lobbying. That distinctively American version of pluralism had its beginnings in the work of Follett’s contemporary Arthur Bentley (1908), but there are no references to Bentley in Follett’s work and no indication that she was influenced by him. Her political theory also was not the English variety of pluralism which, instead of emphasizing the influence of groups upon the state, insisted upon the groups’ independence from control or influence by the state (Magid, 1941; Nicholls, 1974). Indeed, there was much in the English tradition with its emphasis on ancient notions of church-related corporatism that Follett dismissed as being little more than medievalism (Follett, 1918, pp. 267-270).

Following neither the English nor the American paths, Follett characteristically chose to go her own way. The important aspect of her thought that sets it apart from the dominant strands of pluralism is that she sought to reform and revitalize democracy through a “participant electorate” (the title of Chapter XII of her 1924 book Creative Experience). Such an electorate would not exercise its powers through formal constitutional structures or geographical legislative jurisdictions. Neither would it do so through the activities of the pluralists’ interest groups. Rather, her participant electorate would develop its power through face-to-face deliberation at the local level. In her version of group processes, Follett’s theory is very similar to contemporary sociology’s view of groups as mediating structures. It was a theory of neighborhood groups and neighborhood democracy, of local groups coming together in pursuit of common purposes. Working toward some narrow local purpose, however, was but the beginning for Follett. Her group process is rather like a series of continuously expanding concentric circles in which groups continuously interact with – and form federating relationships with – other groups. There results a rising series of multiple decentralized group federalisms, each of
increasing scale, until all of the smaller federalisms culminate in the nation-state.19 Her argument was that

... every neighborhood must be organized; the neighborhood groups must then be integrated, through larger intermediary groups, into a true state. Neither our cities nor our states can ever be properly administered until representatives from neighborhood groups meet to discuss and thereby to correlate the needs of all parts of the city, of all parts of the state [and] we must give official recognition to such gatherings, we must make them a regular part of government. The neighborhood must be actually, not theoretically, an integral part of city, of state, of nation (Follett, 1918, pp. 245-246).

Follett’s view of a decentralized group federalism arising from the bottom and consisting of ever shifting group alignments and realignments, groups endlessly unifying and re-unifying (“uniting and reuniting” will not do, for such a wording implies a fixity profoundly at odds with Follett’s thought), is far removed from the two distinct types of structural federalism found in the United States and Canada.20 In her own words, she describes a federal state in which “Power not ‘granted,’ not ‘derived,’ but self-evolved [her emphasis], implies always federal relation; that is a unifying from below which involves the progressive increase of power” (Follett, 1924, pp. 227-228). In this very particular understanding of a federalism of groups, Follett joined many in the Progressive Era who shared a “vision of democratic reform whereby citizens at various levels could make their wishes known” (Gunnell, 2004, p. 91). Through such a process she hoped, as a contemporary observed, “to revivify local life” (Willoughby, 1930, p. 452). The result is an idealistic, near utopian, vision of communitas that, while attractive, was criticized for its unreality even in Follett’s own day (Willey, 1924).

With the publication of The New State (1918) and Creative Experience (1924) Follett had successfully crystallized one very important aspect of her thought about individuals and groups – she had formulated from her years of social activism an encompassing political theory of popular government at all levels that arose from group organization in the neighborhood. Over the course of the remaining years of her life she would draw from her experiences a similar theory, again based upon individuals and groups, which she would apply to every aspect of organizational life, from the private corporation to international relations and the League of Nations.

**Individual and Group: The Scholar-Activist and her Contemporaries**

Follett forged intense personal relationships and seemed able to charm just about everyone. Lyndall Urwick, the great English theorist of organization and administration, recalled his first meeting with Follett in these words, “In two minutes flat, I was at her feet and remained there ‘til the day she died” (Quote in Babcock, 1998, p. 114). Her overwhelmingly warm, embracing, generous personality won her friends wherever she went. These friendships with leaders of government, commerce, industry, and the arts put Follett in the midst of a trans-Atlantic network of women and men of distinction and power.
In Boston, Follett’s circle of intimates included the philosopher Ella Lyman Cabot and her husband Dr. Richard Cabot, a physician and professor of medicine at Harvard. Ella Cabot (1866-1934) was a near-contemporary to Follett and, along with her husband, was among her closest friends. The bond with the Cabots was professional as well as personal, for Ella Cabot had studied with the Pragmatist philosopher Josiah Royce and had published a number of books and many articles in the fields of education, civics, ethics, and citizenship. She was also an established lecturer at Boston area colleges and schools (Kaag, 2008). According to Kaag (p. 136), Ella Cabot’s own philosophical work had an important influence on Mary Follett when she wrote *Creative Experience* (Follett, 1924).

Another important figure was Pauline Agassiz Shaw, “A Forgotten Visionary” (Hoffman, 2000). Daughter of the Harvard naturalist Louis Agassiz, she is best known for having pioneered the kindergarten movement in the United States, but she also supported, from her own funds, a number of schools, community centres, woman’s suffrage activities, and other progressive social causes. An extremely wealthy widow, Shaw kept an open checkbook for almost any cause that Follett was inclined to support – especially in the area of education. And Follett’s friendship with Justice Louis Brandeis and his wife Alice Goldmark Brandeis would very likely have brought Follett into broader association with others in the Goldmark family who shared Follett’s interests. Distinguished émigré Jewish intellectuals and social activists, the family included Alice’s three sisters: Josephine, a “champion of scientific management and social reform” (Schachter, 2004, p. 31), Pauline, who was active in reforming child labor laws, and Helen, who married Felix Adler, the founder of a non-theistic religion known as the Ethical Culture Society (Schachter, 2004, pp. 31, 34). It is also known, as Sharon Strom (1992) has pointed out, that Follett was on good terms with Mary Barnett Gilson, whose social views were among the most radically feminist of the time. In her recollection of a “thrilling weekend” spent at the home of Follett’s friend, the industrialist Henry Dennison, Gilson reports that “Mary Follett was there and we had a lively discussion of the new state which might evolve out of the current chaos, when healthy and creative industrial relations would be basic to a sound political organism” (Quoted in Strom, 1992, p. 162).

When one considers the totality of Follett’s intellectual interests – this Renaissance woman whose reading and research ranged across diverse disciplines and literatures in both ancient and modern languages – it is not surprising that famous names from the cultural and political elites on both sides of the Atlantic are notable in her network of social and professional friendships. Follett was a classmate of the great American writer Gertrude Stein, long resident in Paris, who served as literary guru to Ernest Hemingway and many other American expatriates there. In England, Follett’s social network included the novelist Virginia Woolf and her husband Leonard; Lord Baden-Powell, a general in World War I and founder of the Boys’ and Girls’ Guides movement; the Cadburys and Rowntrees (leading Quaker industrialists); and Lord Haldane and his sister Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane, both of whom shared Follett’s interests in education, vocational guidance, and placement services for young people (Tonn, 2003). Perhaps most importantly Follett shared a home with Dame Katherine Furse, who combined an intellectual and artistic background with extensive practical experience as head of highly complex organizations. Furse had, for example, served as...
commandant-in-chief of a voluntary organization within the Red Cross which provided medical assistance to British forces during the 1914-1918 war. Later, she became “head of the new Women’s Royal Naval Service, where she recruited, trained, and dispatched to service more than 7,000 women” (Tonn, 2003, p. 463).25

In the areas of management, organizational thought, and public administration, Follett had close ongoing professional relationships with Lyndall Urwick, later the editor of her London School of Economics lectures (Follett, 1949), co-editor of two editions of her collected papers (Fox & Urwick, 1973b; Metcalf & Urwick, 1941b), and co-editor with Luther Gulick of the Papers on the Science of Administration (1937); with William Mosher, first dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship at Syracuse University where Follett was a regular guest lecturer; and with a great variety of business and industrial leaders whom she met through her association with the Taylor Society or through her consulting and lecturing for the Bureau of Personnel Administration.26 This extensive network of friends and professional associates gave Follett endless stimulus, support, and encouragement. The network is also, perhaps, one of the strongest arguments in support of Follett’s thesis that individuals find their most complete identity and fullest development not as atomistic individuals but as individuals within a group (Follett, 1918, 1919, 1924).

Follett’s Place in the Social Sciences: Where Do Her Contributions Lie?

It is the encompassing scope of Follett’s approach to all types of organizations that contributes to the wide diversity of opinion as to where her greatest scholarly contributions lie. While Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow are considered to be among the founders of public administration and share credit or blame for the politics-administration dichotomy (a word that neither of them is known to have used), Follett’s thinking about American institutions has been overshadowed by her later writings on organizations.

In many ways that work on organizational analysis can be seen as anticipating the future. Graham (2003), for example, called Follett a “Prophet of Management.” More specific acknowledgments of her contributions to our present thought include those of John Child (2003, pp. 90-91), who says that Follett’s approach to the process of conflict anticipates the development of structuration theory in contemporary sociology, that her emphasis on “constructive” conflict can now be explored more fully through developments in Information Technology (IT) that focus upon contested learning, and that her approaches to conflict resolution processes are well illustrated in the various ways that one nation in an international joint venture makes use of technology and management ideas from the external partner.

Nitin Nohria (2003, pp. 157-160) points out that Follett’s essays on the use of power and authority anticipate contemporary ideas such as the “knowledge-worker . . . [and the] learning organization,” Macgregor’s Theory X and Theory Y, decentralized rather than hierarchical administration, agency theory, job enrichment, and workplace democracy, among others. Nohria further notes that her essay on “Power” contains “one of the clearest statements of what the cur-
rent buzzword ‘empowerment’ really means” (p. 157). Henry Mintzberg (2003), in a similar vein, argues that the development of managerial ideas likely would have advanced at a more rapid rate if Follett’s ideas had remained in current discourse rather than slipping into obscurity. Such ideas as total quality management (TQM), “quality of work life,” “group responsibility,” “participative management,” “collective responsibility,” and others, he asserts, are all prefigured in Follett’s work (pp. 202-204). Certainly it is the case that the ways in which she approached organizational design and administration emphasized personal strengths, ways to draw upon those strengths, ways in which those strengths could be encouraged – and all of these are essential parts of our contemporary organizational thought (Phillips, 2007, 2008).

In the public sector, in public administration proper, Follett is sometimes considered a transitional figure between the scientific management of Frederick W. Taylor and the later human relations school (Van Riper, 1987, p. 15) or as a precursor to organizational humanism (Kramer, 1987, pp. 427-428). Another point of view is held by those who see her as a member of the “administrative management” school of thought due to her focus on the “upper echelons” of organizations as contrasted with Taylorism’s focus on the assembly line (Henry, 1987, p. 43). However she is viewed chronologically or theoretically, Farmer (1995) has it right when he says of her that she is among those “prominent management thinkers” who, while unlikely to think of themselves as ‘public administrationists,’ have nevertheless been ‘adopted’ by the discipline” (p. 130).27

In whatever way Mary Follett might be categorized, it is nevertheless clear that she remained committed to scientific approaches to management, if not to “scientific management” as Taylor described it.28 Certainly she took a more humanistic approach to management than we normally consider the case with “classic” scientific management. While seeing her work as firmly grounded in the scientific knowledge of her day (Follett, 1918, 1924, 1927a, 1931a), Follett nevertheless pushed the boundaries of administration and management away from narrow technicism toward the full development of the individual and toward an emphasis upon a web of organizational relationships (Newman & Guy, 1998; Schachter, 2002) while resolutely rejecting traditional relationships based upon organizational hierarchy (Follett, 1927c, 1931b).

Transforming Organization and Democracy: Follett as Visionary

In considering all that Mary Follett wrote about politics, democracy, science and scientific method, psychology, organizations, and administration, one can come away from it with a sense of satisfaction in her fundamental consistency of thought29 or a sense of frustration because the diffuseness and circularity of her writings make it so difficult to get a clear picture of that thought. Perhaps, had she lived to complete her studies of the League of Nations, Follett would have produced as her magnum opus a treatise – grounded in her understanding of science – that presented a comprehensive and unified theory of democracy applicable to both the public and private sectors. However difficult it is for those of us who came after her to put together the entire set of puzzle pieces in her socio-political theories, it is very clear that she did have such a comprehensive vision. As early as her study of The New State (1918) Follett wrote that “Democracy is a method, a scientific
technique of evolving the will of the people” (p. 160). Later, in *Creative Experience* (1924) there is a note of Taylorism in her description of the stultification of the lives of factory workers:

The motor impulses produced by the life of the factory have often become dormant because there is no opportunity for outlet. . . . The problem of democracy is to find an outlet for our motor impulses within the conditions which produce them. Any other way is fraught with the gravest danger (pp. 223-224).

Similarly, in gaining and exercising power within the organization she wrote that she was “not advocating a type of leadership which abandons to others, for some thoroughly mistaken notion of democracy, one iota of power. The great leader gathers power, and uses it as the energizing, the motor, force of a progressive enterprise” (Follett, 1927b, p. 241). In her discussion of power, power-over, and power-with, she emphasizes that, “*With is a pretty good preposition, not because it connotes democracy, but because it connotes functional unity, a much more profound conception than that of democracy as usually held*” (Follett, 1941a, p. 62).

In summary, there is no doubt that Follett had a deep and abiding faith in democracy, but “not in our old understanding of the word, but something better than that” (Follett, 1941b, p. 249). It is also clear that her hope was to strengthen democratic processes by empowering (even if she did not use that word) everyone within an organization – workers, managers, administrators – no matter what their position. On the other hand, Follett never escapes her philosophical roots and, in her most passionate moments, it is possible for her to slip into a mystical mist. Asserting that “Life *would be* ‘just one damned thing after another’” (Follett, 1918, p. 312) if she could not unify her diverse interests, she retreats to a Hegelian position and turns it over to the state to do the organizing:

The true state must gather up every interest within itself. It must take over many loyalties and find how it can make them one. . . . The true state has my devotion because it gathers up into itself the various sides of me, is the symbol of my multiple self, is my multiple self brought to significance, to self-realization. If you leave me with my plural selves, you leave me in desolate places, my soul craving its meaning, its home. The home of my soul is in the state (Follett, 1920, p. 312).

This is not an isolated outburst. Along similar lines she calls for a “gospel” of citizenship not of duty but of “passion and joy” and finds that “the redemptive power is within the social bond” (Follett, 1918, pp. 340-341).

It is difficult for us, with the mind-set of our own time, to be attracted to a Romanticized vision of such quintessentially nineteenth-century character or, for that matter, even to find it intelligible. And however much we might wish to be endlessly organizing, unifying, and integrating our diverse interests, some interests just cannot be unified or integrated. There are, as the Scottish philosopher W. B. Gallie (1956) noted half a century ago, “essentially contested concepts” (p. 167) that cannot be reasoned away or rationally combined. Science is such a concept. The work of Newton and
Follett can be called science and their methods can be called scientific, but they did not have the same understandings of the very words that they used in common. And when – out of the deepest levels of conviction, ideology, or faith – one asserts, as Martin Luther did, “Here I stand, I can do no other,” that is a “value” position that cannot be integrated with others.

Still, we need visionaries. If the visionaries give us intelligible goals, it is not unreasonable for them to leave to others the hard work of finding a path to those goals and developing appropriate mechanisms to make them work. Follett was such a visionary. Her endlessly optimistic and hopeful view of humanity had sustained many hard shocks in her lifetime but those shocks had not shaken her. That she gave us no better a road map to her goals and no detailed set of organizational-political mechanisms through which to achieve them is a criticism that only recognizes that much work remains to be done.

References


Endnotes

1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The author is especially indebted to Meredith A. Newman for her insights on Mary Follett’s work and for her very helpful suggestions on the development of this article. He is also indebted to Willa M. Bruce, Beverly S. Bunch, Alonzo J. Mackelprang, William H. Miller, Kent D. Redfield, and two anonymous reviewers for Public Voices.

2 When Gulick wrote his foreword it is likely that all of the contributors were indeed men for, according to Stivers (2006), Follett’s paper was included almost as an afterthought at the suggestion of Sara Greer, the librarian of the Institute of Public Administration.

3 Thompson, too, must be included in Drucker’s category of “exceptional women” who were “stars” in their day, for Follett’s biographer notes that Thompson was “the only woman appointed a master teacher at Thayer Academy for more than twenty years” (Tonn, 2003, p. 22).

4 Hart was a historian but, when political science was established at Harvard as a separate academic discipline, Hart was the department’s first chairman (Gunnell, 2004, p. 101).

5 A note on gender usage: The literature of the time is consistently male-oriented in its language. Follett’s own writings are also consistent in the use of male pronouns whether in reference to men, particularly, or as being inclusive of women and men, as was common to the literary style of the era.

6 W. E. B. Du Bois, a founder of the NAACP, was another reformer deeply influenced by Albert Bushnell Hart’s focus upon facts. Du Bois is reported to have said that Hart led him to “the social sciences as the field for gathering and interpreting that body of fact which would apply to my program for the Negro” (Quoted in Kloppenberg, 1998, p. 129).

7 This view of science and fact also shaped the research by Follett’s close friend Seebohm Rowntree when in 1899 he began his famous study of poverty in York. In that study there is a sentence remarkably similar to Hart’s in which Rowntree asserts that “I did not set out upon my inquiry with the object of proving any preconceived theory, but to ascertain actual facts” (Quoted in Briggs, 1961, p. 24).

8 For more information on Follett’s study of the Speaker, there is a recent review (Phillips, 2009) of the 2008 reissue of her book.

9 The social historian James Kloppenberg (1998) lists Bentley along with Wesley C. Mitchell and John B. Watson as being among those who, in his view, distorted William James’s and John Dewey’s philosophy into behaviorism.

10 The negative impact that this simplistic physical science conception of science and scientific method had on the theory and practice of public administration from the Progressive Era to our own time has been analyzed in a number of important contributions to the literature (Guy, 2003; Guy, Newman, & Mastracci, 2008a, 2008b; Newman, 2005; Newman & Guy, 1998; Stivers, 2000, 2002).

11 A full examination of the various debates over science and scientific method in political science is beyond the scope of this article. Readers interested in the historical context of those topics in Follett’s era should consult the excellent works of John Gunnell (1993, 2004, 2005), James Ceaser (1990), and Raymond Seidelman (1985). Another important literature relates to differences between feminist views of scientific method – from Jane Addams to the present – and male dominated Newtonian science. See, for example, Burnier (2003a, 2003b, 2003c), Kaag (2008), and the works by Newman, Guy, Stivers, and Mastracci cited above.

12 Much of the practical work of these philosophers focused on the provision of continuing education for boys and girls in the workplace. Follett’s Quaker friends the Cadburys and Rowntrees were among the leading British industrialists who shared this interest and who provided such education in their plants. A prospectus for just such a school – a Manchester area industrial day school that served boys aged fourteen to seventeen and girls aged fourteen to sixteen – can be found in Appendix C of Farnham (1921, pp. 473-476).

13 Haldane had published works on Schopenhauer and had a distinguished and controversial political career, serving as Minister for War and as Lord Chancellor.

14 In the United States the equivalent to the British industrial day-school was called a “Vestibule School.” These vestibule schools often added to their job-related classes, specific training in citizenship and “Americanizing” newly arrived immigrants (Jacques, 1996, pp. 125-126).

15 In addition to Gehlke (1924), Nicholls (1974) provides good coverage of English and American pluralism. Although focused on American pluralism, Baskin (1972) provides a brief historical overview, inclusive of English
thought, in his first chapter. Kariel’s (1961) classic study of American pluralism has a brief treatment of Follett’s ideas. 

16 The classic statement of American pluralism is, of course, that of James Madison in Federalist X, but Madison’s view of the dangers of factions and how they might be controlled is far removed from the complex organizational structures, political action committees, and lobbying practices of pressure groups in the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries.

17 Hirst (1989, pp. 2-4) provides a very clear and concise statement of the differences between English pluralism and American interest-group pluralism.

18 Follett’s attack on “medievalism” in pluralist analyses of group life is related to nineteenth century controversies over the legal character and rights of the religious corporation, understood as persona ficta, a doctrine promulgated by Pope Innocent IV in the thirteenth century (Gierke, 1900, pp. xiv, xviii, xxi). A second aspect of the pluralist controversy lay in the distinction between a corporation aggregate and a corporation sole, and between a religious and a lay corporation. The legal definition of these four types of corporation can be found in Chapter XVIII of Blackstone (1787, pp. 467-485). A third aspect of the pluralist controversy had to do with the complexities of the “real personality” of the state. This aspect is discussed by Runciman (1997) and Nicholls (1994).

19 Follett’s view of federalism is clearly not that of the then-prevailing “dual federalism,” or even that of “cooperative federalism” (Elazar, 1984; Grodzins, 1966) as it developed in later decades. Interestingly, the idea of a cooperative federalism was probably first described by Jane Perry Clark, Follett’s younger contemporary, in a book published after Follett’s death (Clark, 1938).

20 “In the United States of America the central government can exercise only the powers delegated to it under the constitution, the constituent states retaining the residual authority to act in any matters not specifically designated as federal; whereas in the Dominion of Canada the federal government has residual authority over affairs not specifically assigned to the constituent states, or ‘provinces’” (MacIver, 1965, p. 122).

21 Kaag is mistaken, however, in his assertion that the book is dedicated solely to Follett’s “friend and mentor: Ella Lyman Cabot” (Kaag, 2008, p. 136); the dedication is to both Cabots.

22 A specially printed and bound book (Pauline Agassiz Shaw, 1917) was prepared for Shaw’s memorial service held at Boston’s famed Faneuil Hall on Easter Sunday, April 8, 1917. It contains an impressively long list of schools, libraries, nurseries, and other organizations and activities that were supported by her generosity.

23 Pauline Agassiz Shaw’s step-mother Elizabeth Cabot Cary Agassiz became the first president of Follett’s alma mater Radcliffe College. If one were to construct a sociogram of Follett’s intimate friendships it would likely form quite a dense web of interconnections among the various influential individuals and families of Boston.

24 What has become known as a “Brandeis Brief” (i.e., one that includes in it non-legal arguments such as socio-economic data) originated in the case of Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). It is noteworthy that Louis Brandeis took this case only on condition that Josephine Goldmark gather the data for him (Schachter, 2004, pp. 36-38). Follett’s own comments on this famous case characteristically reflect the emphasis on facts that she had been taught by Albert Bushnell Hart: “The great value of Mr. Justice Brandeis’ brief in the Oregon case concerning the constitutionality of limiting the hours of women in industry, was his insistence upon social facts” (Follett, 1918, p. 129).

25 One can get a feel for this small world of practice and scholarship, of the interweaving and interpenetration (to use Follett’s terminology) of the academic, commercial, and industrial worlds by examining the lists of participants in the Bureau of Personnel Administration Conferences (Metcalf, 1925, 1926, 1927a, 1927b, 1931). The overlap is marked and, with the exception of Linking Science and Industry (Metcalf, 1925), a conference in which she is not listed, Follett is by far the participant with the largest number of published papers.

26 This overview of Follett’s place in the social sciences does not even approach a comprehensive listing of ideas, concepts, laws, and theories in her work that can be seen as precursors to present day scholarship in a variety of disciplines. The author’s preliminary compilation of almost two hundred such linkages runs the gamut from alternative dispute resolution and the rule of anticipated reactions through chaos theory, feminism, and post-modernism to unification theory and win-win situations (Phillips, 2008).

27 Schachter (2002) makes a persuasive argument that women who held positions of leadership in that era had to rely on the language of science if they were to make their influence felt in a world dominated by men. Gunnell (1993, p.
5), in his discussion of late nineteenth and early twentieth century American universities, argues that “In a highly pluralistic society, the authority of knowledge seemed to require speaking with a neutral voice grounded in scientific values and facts.”

29 The notable exception to this generalization, as has been pointed out, is Follett’s first work, The Speaker of the House of Representatives (1896).

30 It is interesting that Follett’s definition of democracy comes so close to the political realism advocated by Frank Goodnow, notably in Politics and Administration (1900), but also in Social Reform and the Constitution (1911).

31 “An ‘essentially contested concept’ [is defined as a concept that is] subject to irresolvable dispute between theorists with differing values” (Marshall, 1994, p. 75).

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Introduction

There is no doubt that the disaster response associated with Hurricane Katrina revealed a system that was in need of repair. Work has been done that demonstrates the need for systemic change in disaster response (Waugh and Streib 2006). Further, there has been a call for transformational leadership to aid in this systemic change (Lester and Krejci 2007, Lester 2007). The works of Mary Parker Follett (1868-1933) were foundational to later work that resulted in the human relations approach, which in turn laid the foundation for leadership principles grounded in the ideas of transformation. Returning to the foundations in order to better understand what needs to be done in designing effective transformation of organizations is quite important to understanding how to proceed with effectuating systemic change. Follett’s insights are of real use to those who want to transform organizations and more specifically to those who wish to apply transformational leadership principles in order to bring this about. With an event like the Hurricane Katrina response demonstrating the need for change, Follett’s work can be quite useful in dealing with the transformational challenges that must be overcome if real change is to be instituted.

What will follow is an examination of transformational leadership principles as applied to systemic changes within the federal (meaning national, state, and local) disaster response system with commentary by Follett on these basic principles. Follett’s insight was ahead of its time and relevant to today’s environment. Our current understanding and response to the challenges can be informed by a voice echoing from across the decades.

Transformation of the Disaster Response System: Follett’s Contributions

One of the necessary ingredients for transformation is the recognition of the need for change. That disaster response did not work well during the Hurricane Katrina response is an obvious statement of fact that is backed up by three major governmental reports: “A Failure of Initiative” coming from the U.S. House of Representatives (2006), “Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Un-
prepared” issued by the U.S. Senate (2006), and the White House report entitled “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned” (2006). Each report is replete with words like “initiative” and “transformation.” In essence, recognition of the need to change is the beginning point of transformation. Without this essential step, nothing happens. These reports along with many other analyses of the events associated with the Hurricane Katrina response help to provide the needed recognition that fundamental changes in the system are necessary.

Follett was not silent on the need for recognition. Though she does not use the term “transformation” or any root of the word in the sense that it is used in transformative leadership, Follett does speak in terms that are quite similar. For example, Follett states that it is essential for a leader to

. . . . grasp a total situation. The chief mistake in thinking of leadership as resting wholly on personality lies probably in the fact that the executive leader is not a leader of men but of something we are learning to call the total situation. This includes facts, present and potential, aims, the leader must find the unifying thread. He must see a whole, not a mere kaleidoscope of pieces. He must see the relation between all the different factors in a situation (Follett 1995, 168).

This is precisely the understanding needed to begin transformation. This quote from Follett contains no earth shattering pronouncement. Yet, if what is sometimes known as “situational leadership” is not present, there is no foundation from which to launch any needed change. Follett correctly understood that leaders must be able to ascertain the “total situation” and to be cognizant of both the “present” and “potential” situations. The idea of seeing the whole instead of pieces to a situation allows the leader to see things on a systemic level. This allows the leader or leaders to supply a unifying theme to organizational members that focuses on seeing the environment for what it is and is becoming. This understanding of the present and potential environment lays the fundamental groundwork for transforming the organization or system. Understanding can then lead to a diagnosis of problems which in turn can lead to organizational changes in order to solve the problems.

Follett’s understanding of the need to see the whole is exactly what needs to happen in intergovernmental relations if we are to overcome many of our wicked problems. Instead of each part functioning in its own domain and only seeing portions of a problem and thereby possibly only portions of solutions, there needs to be a unifying purpose based around seeing whole solutions. Some call for centralization in order to achieve unity when unity is not the goal. Seeing the “whole” is the goal. Follett rejects centralization as a means to achieve this goal. Follett understood that centralization can cause its own problems by limiting an organization’s ability to see a situation from multiple perspectives (Follett 1995, 125). In disaster response, there is the problem of different government organizations seeing the task before them only through the prism of their particular organizational lenses. This makes coordination and collaboration extremely difficult. Of course, this could be overcome by highly centralizing the response and only looking through one or a few sets of eyes. However, the cost would be a lack of situational awareness. Follett’s point is that there
needs to be centralization, but it is centralization of purpose after seeing the whole. This is quite different from organizational centralization. Follett states that “Leader and followers are both following the invisible leader – the common purpose” (Follett 1995, 172). With the actual leader being “purpose,” it is incumbent upon all organizational members to grasp the purpose of the organization so that there can be a continual feedback and adjustment loop for optimum performance. This necessitates the diffusion of responsibility as more eyes come to bear on the organizational environment. Indeed, a good leader according to Follett will attempt to train organizational members to exercise leadership themselves (Follett 1995, 173). This allows for a better and quicker response to a changing environment as organizational members possess the ability to apply the “common purpose” to the changing environment. Follett further states, “When there is identification with organizational goals, the members tend to perceive what the situation requires and to do it whether the boss exerts influence to have it done or not. In fact, he need not be present or even aware of the immediate circumstances” (Follett 1995, 177). The ability to function in the chaos of a disaster is an important ability. It can only be developed when “common purpose” is shared. Nowhere is this perhaps more apropos than in disaster response. Much of the recent literature on disaster response calls for responding governments and organizations to have improved coordination of purpose and a respect for what all levels and types of governments and organizations have to offer to the common purpose (Bass and Avolio 1994, Waugh and Streib 2006, Lester and Krejci 2007, Lester, 2007).

While many see federalism as an impediment to a coordinated response and call for a centralization of response authority at the national level, this is exactly the opposite position taken by most experts in disaster response. The key according to Follett is to bring all of these participants to a point of common purpose and to provide superior training and ultimately the authority to use that training in real world situations. Follett states that the leader “has to teach them (followers) how to control the situations for which they are responsible” (Follett 1995, 172). Follett also states regarding leadership among subordinates that “the best leaders try to train their followers themselves to become leaders” (Follett 1995, 173). This is precisely the type of decentralized authority that many disaster response experts have put forward.

The point of much of the training that preceded Hurricane Katrina through exercises like the “Hurricane Pam” exercise and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) was to facilitate decision making and coordination between federal, state and local government. The proper goals were often in place, but the desire for real change was lacking. The exercises too often left important leaders and decision makers out of the equation. Where there was ambiguity as to authority and coordination, it was covered with buzz words like “joint” and “collaborative.” While the rhetoric is correct and often in line with Follett’s way of thinking, the reality when actually tested by disaster was often not “joint” or “collaborative.” When leadership authority needed to be exercised, there was confusion and a lack of coordination in large part because the tough questions had been shunted to the side (Lester and Krejci 2007). It might be that Follett would say that the flowery language of cooperation adopted in the training exercises and rhetoric mentioned above was a mask for what she calls “power-over,” which is the power to conquer one’s opponent or to get them to acquiesce (Follett 1995, 102-103). The national government, working
through NIMS procedures and rules, attempts to control the decision making environment. So, when a real large-scale emergency comes to the forefront, the “power-over” tendencies that underlie the system come to the surface. The basic tendency is toward an adversarial relationship despite the language of cooperation that surrounds the structures. One entity tries to control (power-over) the other. The result is a lack of coordination, which Follett addressed decades before this played out during the Hurricane Katrina response.

Follett would counter with the need for a “power-with” that emphasizes jointly developed power. Admittedly, this will take a transformation of the current system toward true collaboration, which is a deeper concept than cooperation. Follett gives us a key to overcoming the tendency toward “power-over” by introducing the “law of the situation.” As Follett states, “If both sides will obey the law of the situation, no person has the power over another” (Follett 1995, 107). If the leaders will allow the situation to dictate the optimal arrangement of power or authority in disaster response, it will be shared between levels of government in a collaborative fashion. The result will be diffusion of leadership.

The term “collaboration” deserves more attention as it relates to Follett’s work and systemic change in disaster response. The language routinely found in NIMS stresses cooperation. However, collaboration is a deeper concept. It is more than just tangentially touching in common areas of concern. Collaboration connotes a deeper understanding of goals and a joint development of goals and strategies for achieving those goals. What is needed in disaster response is a systemic change toward collaboration. Follett recognized the necessity of deep and joint collaboration for optimal organizational performance. Though Follett did not adopt the term “collaboration,” she did have four fundamental principles of organization that were considered by Follett to be basic to effective management. The first principle is to relate all factors in a given situation. Second, there should be direct communication between all of the responsible people involved in an endeavor, no matter their hierarchical or departmental positions. Third, there should be involvement of all people directly concerned from the beginning stages of designing a project or formulating a policy. Lastly, it is important to see all of this as a process that is ongoing since there is no endpoint of absolute unity but only the process of continual progress toward a unified purpose and response (Graham 1995).

The first principle regarding “situation” has already been discussed. The second principle presented by Follett concerning the need for direct communication between all responsible parties regardless of position has been mentioned as a necessary step in any transformation of disaster response (Lester and Krejci 2007). For Follett, this is paramount because it allows the combined insight and capability of an organization and relating organizations to come to bear on a situation. Anything less is a squandering of opportunity and resources. As Follett states, “The first rule, then, for obtaining integration is to put your cards on the table, face the real issue, uncover the conflict, bring the whole thing into the open” (Follett 1995, 75). This is an important lesson that must be applied to the current system of disaster response. It is necessary to face the real issues of power, often related to federalism, and to work through them to some sort of solution. This will by necessity require the
participation of all relevant actors or else the enterprise will fail when hidden items or even overlooked items of contention come to the fore during a disaster response (Lester and Krejci 2007).

Next, Follett emphasizes that the involvement of all relevant actors should be from conception to implementation. This allows all involved to understand what is going on and to have input throughout the process. This results in improved response as the total environment is more effectively approximated. It also puts every relevant actor on the same page as regards mission. Follett states quite succinctly and yet powerfully, “Wherever you have joint responsibility, it can only be met jointly” (Follett 1995, 197). The simplicity of this sentence should not obscure its profound depth. Much has been written on the need to develop organizations that tap into this joint potential. Yet, Follett has concisely emphasized the absolute essence of what needs to happen in disaster response. Federal, state, and local authorities all have responsibility. It is joint responsibility. To meet their obligations will require truly collaborative responses (Waugh and Streib 2006, Lester and Krejci 2007).

Follett’s last point about ongoing process is important to tie these principles together. Since situations are ever evolving and since the actors are ever evolving and causing their own changes in the development of the situation, it is vital that the collaborative process be an ongoing endeavor. Follett states,

> The most important thing to remember about unity is – that there is no such thing. There is only unifying. You cannot get unity and expect it to last a day – or five minutes. Every man in a business should be taking part in a certain process and that process should be unifying. Every man’s success in business depends largely, I believe, on whether he can learn something of this process, which is one neither of subordination nor of domination, but of each man learning to fit his work into that of every other in a spirit of co-operation, in an understanding of the methods of co-operation (Follett 1995, 199).

It is important to note that we never arrive at a completely collaborative moment. There are simply too many variables involved. It is a continual process. Hence, there is a continual need for collaborative mechanisms and training. This is where a system like NIMS can be important. If the rhetoric of NIMS can be true to its plain meaning, NIMS can serve as a forum for collaborative exploration and development. However, if NIMS is simply a smokescreen for national government domination of the disaster response system and minimizes other relevant actors and their concerns, it will fail for precisely the reasons Follett espouses. Yet, if NIMS or some other way is found to bring relevant parties together in a collaborative environment, a truly transformed system can be fashioned (Lester and Krejci 2007).

**Conclusion**

There is no doubt that disaster response is in need of systemic change. Dr. John R. Harrald said
this well when he stated on September 15, 2005 before the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform regarding the response to Hurricane Katrina, “If we ignore the systemic issues and simply replace people or re-assign responsibilities, we may simply fail again in the not too distant future with a different cast of characters” (U.S. House 2005). While much has been written and discussed regarding the need for change and how to accomplish this goal, we would be remiss to believe that all the relevant writing and thinking has been done in contemporary times. Mary Parker Follett speaking and writing in the early part of the twentieth century laid out ideas concerning these timely matters that have relevance to today’s discussion about transformation. Revisiting these well thought out principles can help us to avoid “reinventing the wheel.” Follett has given us patterns of relating that are challenging to the status quo. She does not sugarcoat how difficult change can be. Follett emphasized that real change requires a team effort involving all relevant actors in an organization and in a process. Further, Follett stressed that new ways of relating and thinking must be developed in order to deal with an ever evolving landscape.

This all sounds eerily familiar to what is being proposed today in order to create an improved response to disasters. Follett’s contributions also have relevance to the “wicked” problems that are so prevalent in the first part of the 21st century. We are facing an environment where our modern problems increasingly defy the bureaucratic boxes that we try to put them in. While Follett’s work certainly casts light on reforming disaster response, it could be that disaster response is just a more visible candidate for reform. Our institutions need reform to face our increasingly complex and intersected problems. That many of these issues were tackled by Follett so many decades ago is a testimony to her unique insight and gift for application. Seemingly, the fundamental problems and dilemmas remain quite similar. We benefit by examining Follett’s work and then applying it to our own work, which in turn can lead us toward a better response system. Recognizing Follett’s work today not only honors her important contributions, it also can save valuable time as we examine much that has already been dealt with about how to put together collaborative and effective responses. And, time is a commodity that is in short supply as we face many of the wicked problems of the 21st century.

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The 1946 Railroad Strike: Harry Truman and the Evolution of Presidential Power

Bill Wiese

Sixty three years after the most serious labor strike in American history, the actions that brought the nation to a standstill are today almost totally forgotten. On May 23, 1946, the country’s two most powerful railroad unions, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, declared a strike and, within hours, 250,000 members had walked off their jobs. The nation had held its collective breath throughout the spring of 1946 as the leaders of the two unions played a game of brinkmanship with the government and with the American people. Thankfully, the strike lasted only two days, but its impact on both the nation’s economy and the American psyche was unprecedented. Those Americans who lived through the drama that gripped the nation in the spring of 1946 and were old enough to remember it at the time are today septuagenarians or older. None of the major figures directly involved in the dispute survived.

Reaction to the strike on the part of President Harry Truman was swift and dramatic. While never granted, his request to Congress for emergency power to draft the striking workers into the army remains to this day the single most radical proposal ever publicly made by any American president in relation to a lawfully organized labor action. The outrage of the Congress to the strike resulted in harsh anti-labor legislation that significantly curbed the power that unions had, at the time of the strike, only recently gained. Their passage of the Hartley Act in 1947 gutted the National Labor Relations Act, also known as the Wagner Act, which had been passed in 1935 and which had granted the strikers many of the rights they were so keen to exercise. Taft-Hartley redefined the relationship between labor and the United States government and its effects reverberate to this day. Sixty three years after its passage, it remains the law of the land.

It would be impossible to understand the impact of the railroad strike without some knowledge of how vastly different the nation’s transportation system was in 1946 from what we know today. Currently, railroad shipping accounts for only about 12.7 percent of the nation’s goods (Railroad Industry, 2009), but at the time of the 1946 strike, railroads were without question the economic lifeline of the nation, moving more than 65 percent of all freight. Railroads literally moved the na-
tion. As noted by Clark Clifford, a trusted assistant and counsel to President Truman, and later Secretary of Defense under President Lyndon Johnson, in his memoir *Counsel to the President*, “...in 1946, they [railroads] still played a central role in American life, far more than it is possible to imagine today. Most Americans traveled by train rather by car or airplane, and with interstate trucking still in its infancy, the rails carried most of the nation’s freight” (Clifford, 1991, p. 87).

New York City was a perfect example of the nation’s dependence on the railroads; in 1946, three-quarters of the fresh fruit, vegetables and eggs, and virtually all of the meat, butter and cheese was delivered by rail (“Worst Food and Fuel Crisis,” 1946). In its dependence, New York City was not alone – every city in America depended on the railroads to deliver food, fuel, raw materials, and finished goods.

In 1946, the nation had more than 250,000 miles of railroad tracks, compared to roughly 140,000 miles as of 2006. In addition to hauling freight, trains moved people. Millions of Americans relied on trains for their daily work and occasional pleasure commutes. In 1946 alone, the railroads serviced an estimate 770 million passengers (American-Rail, 2009). Virtually every city and town in the nation with a population greater than twenty thousand had regular railroad service. Thousands of smaller towns had regular rail service as well.

Today, more than 47,000 miles of high speed interstate highways crisp-cross the nation allowing trucks to quickly, efficiently, and cost effectively deliver a majority of the nation’s freight. Sixty years ago the interstate highway system didn’t exist and without it, moving vast amounts of raw materials and finished or semi-finished goods long distances by truck was slow and cost prohibitive. At the time of the railroad strike, the trucking industry was concentrated mostly on the local delivery of goods. The switch from steam to diesel driven locomotives beginning in the 1930s had resulted in substantially reduced costs of shipping, making the railroads an even more attractive method of transport for large producers. Railroads brought commodities to a central point quickly and inexpensively from which trucks delivered them locally or perhaps in some instances regionally. In 1940, railroads and trucks combined logged 434 billion ton miles with railroads accounting for 375 billion ton miles or more than 86 percent of the total (Barger, p. 231). In 1946, the nation’s economy literally ran on rails.

Since his election to the presidency in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt had generally been a friend of labor. He was keenly aware of the value of organized labor to the Democratic Party in general and to his own political agenda in particular. Not that the 1936 election would have turned out differently, Roosevelt won more than 98 percent of the electoral votes, but strong labor support tilted at least 3 states (Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana) into the Democratic column (Smith, 2007, p. 374-375). Throughout his presidency, labor and FDR had a very symbiotic relationship, a true political marriage; they had their spats and their estrangements, but both sides were willing to forgive the other’s occasional indiscretions.

Due to persistent weakness in the nation’s economy related to the lingering effects of the depression, the Wagner Act, more commonly known as the National Labor Relations Act, was signed
into law on July 5, 1935, as part of FDR’s Second New Deal. For the first time in the nation’s history, there was a law on the books that favored the interests of labor over the interests of management. The Wagner Act was a godsend to the American labor movement. In conjunction with the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organization (“CIO”) in 1935, it set organized labor membership on a rapid upward trajectory. According to statistics compiled by the Department of Labor, union membership increased from 3.6 million workers or approximately 13.6 percent of the workforce in 1935, to more than 14.3 million workers or approximately 35.5 percent of the workforce in 1945 (The laborers, n.d.). While the 1945 unionization figures do not represent a high water mark in terms of absolute union membership, they do represent a high point when measured as a percentage of the total labor force.

Comprehensive in nature, the Wagner Act set the bar for union organizing lower than it had ever been, placing specific limits on the employer’s ability to discourage unionization and collective bargaining activities. It guaranteed workers “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection” (Ourdocuments). The guarantee of the right to “engage in concerted activities” would be liberally used and, unfortunately, abused by labor leaders in the not too distant future and would prove to be the source of the act’s eventual undoing.

Roosevelt’s sudden death on April 12, 1945 bequeathed to the nation, a new leader in the form of Vice President Harry S. Truman, a man who was about as opposite as any man could possibly be from his predecessor. Truman did not inspire confidence, even among those who knew him well. Honest to a fault, plain spoken, and direct, he had none of the style, the personal flair, or the consummate political skill of the man he succeeded. He was an untested and virtually unknown entity. A Democrat in the White House was generally good for labor though, and Truman was, after all, a Democrat. With a decent pro-labor voting record in Congress, the unions were hopeful that the nation’s new leader would be as accommodating to their agenda as its previous one had been. They wouldn’t be slow and they wouldn’t be shy in testing him.

The war in Europe had ended in May 1945, and with the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, World War II had at last come to an end. While America’s involvement in foreign wars was over for the time being, the long running war between labor and management was beginning to heat up on the home front. By the fall of 1945, business and industry were clamoring for an end to wartime price controls and organized labor was pushing for an end to wage controls. Trade union membership rosters had risen to dizzying levels undreamed of only a dozen years earlier. More powerful now than they had ever been, unions were ready to flex the muscle they had gained through the maze of New Deal legislation and through political maneuvering and horse trading with FDR.

Now representing more than a third of the nation’s workforce, the organized labor movement had acquired newfound political clout and with that clout a new brand of leadership and a new breed of leader had emerged. Gone were the days when labor had to court politicians – the roles had now
been reversed – and confrontation would be the name of the game in the future. The unions, with a few notable exceptions, had done their part to help win the war. They had played by the rules that had been laid down by the Roosevelt Administration through the Office of Price Administration, their members foregoing wage increases and working longer hours to help keep the nation’s factories running as millions of men and women headed off to war. Now the war was over and workers were looking to make up at least some of the ground that had been lost since 1942. They were anxious to reap the rewards of union membership.

By the fall of 1945, intense pressure from the business community had led to an informal and piecemeal loosening of wartime price controls. The government’s official policy hadn’t changed, but in practice, prices on some goods were allowed to move beyond the established price control limits. Wage controls were not loosened in unison with price controls, however, and the enforcement of the official policy concerning wages remained rigid. Continued maintenance of wage control policies, but not price control policies, was viewed by the unions as an unfair dual standard which was punitive to working men and women. Labor was in no mood for compromise or conciliation; the stage was set for a showdown. “The long wage freeze during the war while industry was working on ‘cost-plus’ contracts had spread discontent through the ranks, and leaders were under pressure to show their mettle and demonstrate the value of union membership to the workers” (Donovan, 1977, p. 116).

In his memoirs, Harry Truman declared that he had decided years before becoming President that “…the country needed a national wage policy, effective mediation machinery, and other remedial legislation which would protect the rightful interests of labor, of management, and of the public” (Truman, 1955, p.498). In an effort to encourage labor and management to put their own house in order by working together, the President convened a summit of leaders from both sides on November 5, 1945. The conference was attended by thirty six delegates representing both labor and management, and included the leaders of the AFL and the CIO, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the United States Chamber of Commerce.

In his opening remarks, the President made it clear that the gathering was not a “government conference” per se, but rather a private conference facilitated by the government. He explained his position and his expectations clearly: both sides should work together to hammer out an agreement between themselves that would address mutual concerns while avoiding work stoppages – giving the participants fair warning that, should they fail to achieve the goals he had set before them, he was ready to exert the full power and influence of the presidency to press Congress for legislation to achieve them.

After nearly a month of wrangling, the conference adjourned on November 30 with nothing to show for its efforts. Not a single recommendation had been made. While the point was apparently lost on the conference participants, the President knew that a golden opportunity had, unfortunately, been squandered. A man of his word, Truman went before Congress on December 3, as promised, and asked that legislation be immediately passed that would, among other things, es-
The 1946 Railroad Strike: Harry Truman and the Evolution of Presidential Power

To establish and require the use of government appointed fact finding boards and impose a mandatory 30 day cooling off period for all future labor disputes. The unions were furious.

In the few short months since the end of the war, things hadn’t gone particularly well for organized labor. By the end of November, the gloves were off and the strikes were on in earnest. By mid December, the number of striking workers had grown to more than 400,000 led by 175,000 autoworkers striking General Motors. Combined with dozens of regional and local wildcat strikes, “concerted activity” by the unions was beginning to exact a heavy toll on the nation’s economy. By year’s end, it seemed that everyone was either on strike or on the verge of striking. There were rumblings of strikes against steel producers, coal mine operators, and most ominously, the railroads. The winter of 1945 was a time that should have been one of great joy for a nation that had just won, in conjunction with its allies, the most brutal and savage war the world had ever known and from which it had emerged as the world’s first, and at that time only, superpower. It wasn’t. The winter of 1945 was destined to become the winter of labor’s discontent, and in their discontent, the nation would suffer, and the relationship between government and labor would be challenged as never before.

The dawn of the New Year brought no relief; the labor situation continued to deteriorate rapidly. “On New Year’s day 1946, 900,000 workers were out, led by the autoworkers; followed soon by 700,000 steelworkers. The year was to register 116,000,000 days of work lost to strikes, three times higher than ever before” (Ferrell, 1994, p.230). Before January was over, 175,000 electrical workers had struck General Electric and Westinghouse, and 300,000 meat packers had walked off the job. Another 400,000 coal miners walked out on April 1.

As winter faded to spring, the lack of progress towards a settlement of the railroad grievances had become a major source of concern to the Truman Administration. A rail strike would be a catastrophe of the first magnitude. The President’s direct personal involvement in negotiations to avert a strike by the rail workers began as early as February 1946. It cannot be said that he did not make settlement of the railroad grievances a priority. He and members of his administration worked diligently to bridge the differences between the twenty railroad unions and the railway operators. Officially, the unions were demanding a significant $2.50 daily wage increase, and modification to 45 assorted work rules. Of the two demands, the wage issue took clear precedence. The rank and file wanted more money. Work rule changes were not the union’s primary focus, and they would not become a sticking point as long as wage demands were met.

On April 10, the White House, based on the recommendations of a fact finding board that had been set up by the Administration, proposed a wage increase of 16 cents an hour, roughly half the increase demanded by the unions. When put to a vote of their members, eighteen of the twenty railroad unions agreed to the proposal. On April 25, however, the two largest and most powerful unions, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, led by Alvanley Johnston, and the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen headed by Alexander Whitney announced their rejection of the offer. They set a strike deadline of May 18. Refusing to take “no” for an answer, the President pressed on with negotiations, re-doubling his efforts to broker a settlement with the maverick union leaders.
until the time the strike actually occurred nearly a month later, Truman did not waver in his belief that a settlement could be reached, and he never stopped working towards that goal.

Unfortunately, negotiations with the powerful railroad unions went nowhere despite Truman’s best efforts and those of his Administration. Since the negotiation process had begun, weeks had stretched into months, and no end was yet in sight. Due to his innate optimism, the President never lost faith that a settlement could be reached, but due to his temperament, he did began to lose patience with the two labor leaders and their continued intransigence. During one face-to-face meeting, Truman, sitting across the table from Johnston and Whitney, declared bluntly, “If you think I’m going to sit here and let you tie up this whole country you’re crazy as hell” (Ferrell, 1994, p. 231). Invoking the specter of the Smith-Connelly Act, he continued the discussion with a threat of a government seizure of the railroads.

The Smith-Connelly Act (also known as the “War Labor Disputes Act”) had been passed by Congress in 1943 over FDR’s veto. The act gave the President extraordinary power to deal with labor strikes should they occur during wartime. It authorized governmental seizure of entire industries if labor actions were judged to be a threat to the nation’s economic or social welfare. While he had initially vetoed the legislation, President Roosevelt had in fact invoked the act for the first time in 1944 in response to a strike by members of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employee’s Union. Enacted to ensure the uninterrupted production of critical materials and the uninterrupted delivery of critical transportation and infrastructure services during wartime, the act had not been rescinded or modified after the war’s end.

The threat of seizure by the government had become an effective bargaining tool in labor negotiations, and it was the government’s ace in the hole when less drastic tactics failed. In his threat, Truman was not bluffing. He was ready to invoke the Smith-Connelly and actually seize the railroads if necessary. He had done it before with other industries, and he would do it again with the railroads if necessary. He viewed seizure by the government as a legitimate tool to be used to keep industries operating that were vital to the economic health and welfare of the nation. The logic in this course of action was clear and unmistakable: if the government was in control of the railroads, then the railroad workers were actually government employees and, as such, had no right to strike, Wagner Act or not. Upon seizure by the government, the President could order workers not to strike if they had not already left their jobs, or he could order them to return to work immediately if they had.

Government seizure under the powers granted by the Smith-Connelly Act also provided a convenient propaganda tool to use in negotiations; in a democracy, the government is assumed to be the representative of the people. A strike against the government then would be a strike not against a faceless fat cat operator, but against every American citizen.

Unimpressed with the President’s threat to seize the railroads, Johnston and Whitney stood their ground. A railroad strike, even one of short duration, would severely disrupt all commerce. If a
strike were called, who would run the trains and the switch yards? Let the President seize the railroads. Let him call in the army, as he had recently done during the coal strike; or the National Guard for that matter. Railroads were vastly different from coal mines and the two labor leaders knew it. After all, it took training and skill to run locomotives and safely manage switch yards, training that soldiers just didn’t have. Soldiers or National Guardsmen might be able to dig coal during a strike, no magic in that – the army had plenty of strong backs - but once the coal was out of the ground, what could be done if the only practical method of transport was effectively shut down?

Based on this logic, Johnston and Whitney felt that they had the upper hand in their struggle with the operators and, in their judgment, there was very little the government could do about it. Thus, why settle for less than everything they were demanding? In addition to the logistical challenges the government would face in trying to operate the railroads without the striking workers, the union leaders knew that the law was on their side; the unions would only be exercising rights accorded them by the Wagner Act in 1935. Alexander Whitney, leader of the Trainmen, made that point perfectly clear when he stated on May 14, “There are no laws or other barriers that prohibit members of the Brotherhoods involved from leaving the service in a lawful strike and from remaining out of service of the carriers until a settlement satisfactory to them has been reached” (“Railroad Strike,” 1946).

While it was true that the unions weren’t breaking any laws, they were violating the public trust, and everyone knew it, everyone, it seems, but Johnston and Whitney. The railroad unions held tremendous power over the economy, and thus over the everyday lives of all Americans, and they had an obligation not to abuse their power to the detriment of the nation, a nation struggling to reintegrate millions of former service men and women into a fragile peacetime economy. Every American knew that a rail strike would impact them personally, seriously, and almost immediately, and they were at the same time both frightened and outraged. Public opinion held that the trainmen and the engineers had a civic duty to put the welfare of the nation and their fellow citizens ahead of their own selfish interests.

Newspapers and radio had done a thorough job of keeping Americans apprised of the situation. The possibility of a strike and the efforts being made to avoid it were front page news across the county throughout the spring of 1946. Because of this widespread coverage, the public knew that eighteen of the twenty railroad unions had been offered and had accepted a settlement that had resulted in a significant hourly wage increase. They also knew that the same generous offer had been made to the holdout unions and that it had been unceremoniously and ungraciously rejected.

On May 15, Truman made a new offer to the two Brotherhoods; the original 16 cents an hour proposed in April, plus an additional 2 1/2 cents in lieu of proposed work rule changes. Still, the two unions refused to budge, and when they did, the President made good on his threat. On May 17, 1946, he signed an executive order in the presence of Johnston and Whitney directing the Office of Defense Transportation to seize the railroads at 4:00PM the following day. Even in the face of the seizure, the union leaders persisted, refusing to back down. Little did they know that in play-
ing their game of brinksmanship with Truman, with Congress, and with the American people, they were sowing the seeds of their own decline. This action reflects the growing power of the President to get his way when pressed.

On May 18 as directed, the Office of Defense Transportation seized the railroads. Now that the government had control of the railroads, what was it supposed to do with them? Even if the President called in the army, the government couldn’t run the railroads without the striking workers and Truman knew it as well as the labor leaders. As so clearly stated by Robert Donovan in his chronicle of the Truman Presidency *Conflict and Crisis*, “In one year he [Truman] had seized the coal mines twice; he had seized the railroads; he had seized 134 meat packing plants; he had seized 91 tug boats; he had seized the facilities of twenty-six oil producing and refining companies; he had seized the Great Lakes Towing Company. And all he had on his hands now was a disaster” (Donovan, 1977, p. 211). Untested when he assumed the presidency only a year earlier, Truman was now exercising presidential power on a scale unprecedented in the nation’s history.

On the same day the government seized the railroads, Johnston and Whitney inflamed the situation further by announcing their rejection of the President’s most recent offer of an 18 1/2 cent an hour wage increase. They hadn’t even presented the offer to the rank and file members for a vote. The President was incensed at this second rejection. He issued a personal appeal to all rank and file members of the two unions urging them to remain on the job for the good of the nation. The appeal fell on deaf ears. In what they felt was a gesture of goodwill, the two union leaders did agree to postpone their threatened strike until May 23. The postponement gave both sides one last chance to step back from the precipice, but to no avail. Unfortunately, no better offers were forthcoming from the operators or from the White House, and the additional five days were used by the Federal Government and by state and local governments around the nation to prepare for the strike.

In cities and towns from border to border and coast to coast, emergency preparations to ensure the safety of the local population were finalized. The New York City Health Commissioner warned that a declaration of a “state of imminent peril” might be issued under which the city would be authorized to seize and ration both food and fuel in the event of a strike (“Worst Food and Fuel Crisis,” 1946). Across the nation, more than a thousand freight and passenger airplanes were earmarked to be commandeered by the government for delivery of critical goods in anticipation of a strike by the railroad workers (“Army Ready to Commandeer,” 1946).

At 4:00PM Eastern time on Thursday, May 23, 1946, the strike deadline arrived and 250,000 members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen began their walk out, ignoring the President’s direct appeal. The full coercive power of the Federal Government, including the seizure of the railroads, had not moved the stubborn labor leaders. Truman’s personal involvement and personal appeals had not moved them. The promise of harsh legislation that was almost certain to follow had not moved them and now, almost unbelievably, the trains had stopped and with them, the nation’s economy.
Time magazine described the scene as strike deadline moved from east to west across the country: “Hour after hour, time zone to time zone, the strike moved west. Engineers and trainmen walked quietly away from cars and locomotives in Cleveland, Memphis, Kansas City, St. Paul. Chicago, the nation’s greatest rail center, was stopped cold, like a three-ring circus halted in mid-show: 25,000 loaded freight cars stood dead on the tracks and 93,750 passengers were marooned” (“National Affairs,” p. 21). The magazine further reported that during the duration of the strike “only 100 of the country’s 17,500 scheduled passenger trains, only 240 of 24,000 freight trains, ever turned a wheel” (“National Affairs,” p. 21). The consequences of the strike were immediate and potentially devastating: “Hotels brought out cots, opened lounges as dormitories (200,000 people were stranded in New York alone). Automobile traffic swelled; crowds mobbed bus terminals and the airlines. There were runs on food stores and gas stations in dozens of U.S. cities” (“National Affairs,” p. 21).

Fed up with the two union leaders, the President decided to take his case directly to the public in a nationwide radio address which he scheduled for 10:00PM Eastern time on May 24. As he waited for his staff to draft the speech he would deliver, Truman vented his spleen by writing a speech of his own, one of the oddest and most aggressive statements ever committed to paper by a United States President. It read in part:

At home those of us who had the country’s welfare at heart worked day and night. But some people worked neither day nor night and some tried to sabotage the war effort entirely. No one knows that better than I. John Lewis called two strikes in War Time to satisfy his ego. Two strikes which were worse than bullets in the back to our soldiers. The rail workers did exactly the same thing. They all were receiving from four to forty times what the man who was facing the enemy fire on the front was receiving.

I am tired of the government’s being flouted, vilified and now I want you men who are my comrades in arms you men who fought the battles to save the nation just as I did twenty-five years ago to come along with me and eliminate the Lewises, the Whitney’s the Johnstons, the Communist Bridges and the Russian Senators and Representatives and really make this a government by and for the people.

Lets give the country back to the people. Lets put transportation and production back to work, hang a few traitors make our country safe for democracy, tell the Russians where to get off and make the United Nations work. Come on boys lets do the job (Donovan, 1977, pp. 212-213).

Written simply to let off steam, the existence of the handwritten document was unknown to historians until 1966. Only a few members of Truman’s trusted inner circle were privy to the speech at the time it was composed. One of them, Clark Clifford, was stunned by its contents. Writing
of the document years later, he noted, “It was the sort of blunt ‘Trumanesque’ language for which he later became famous, but if he spoke in the manner to the nation, the President would do himself immense damage, creating the impression he was losing control of both himself and the government” (Clifford, 1991, p.89). Despite the enormous powers the President derives from his office, there are also restraints to the exercise of that power.

In the speech he did make to the nation on the evening of May 24, Truman delivered a blistering broadside against the striking trainmen. “My fellow countrymen: I come before the American people tonight at a time of great crisis. The crisis of Pearl Harbor was the result of the action by a foreign enemy. The crisis tonight is caused by a group of men within our own country who place their private interests above the welfare of the nation” (Koenig, 1956, p. 232).

In equating the actions of the striking workers and their leaders to the actions of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, the President was labeling them traitors. He proceeded to paint a bleak and uncompromising picture of the damage that had already been inflicted on the nation’s economy and prophesied even worse for the future. “Lack of transportation facilities will bring chaos to food distribution. Farmers cannot move foods to markets. All of you will see your food supplies dwindle, your health and safety endangered, your streets darkened, your transportation facilities broken down” (Koenig, p. 233). Full of contempt, disdain, and indignation, he continued his attack, “It is inconceivable that in our democracy any two men should be placed in a position where they can completely stifle our economy and ultimately destroy our country” (Koenig, p. 235).

This speech didn’t pull any punches in painting the labor leaders as uncompromising, selfish, and un-American. The actions of the two union leaders were jeopardizing not only the economy of the nation but the physical and financial wellbeing of every American citizen as well. They were threatening Europe with starvation. While not yet known as “Give ‘em Hell Harry,” – he wouldn’t acquire that moniker until the 1948 election - Truman did just that, lambasting Johnston and Whitney from behind the podium for nearly 30 minutes. He closed his hellfire and brimstone speech with a promise to speak before a joint session of Congress the next day to present specific proposals for ending the walkout.

Johnston and Whitney must have been stunned by the vehemence of the President’s speech. One can only imagine their mortification at being labeled as traitors and at being so publicly humiliated by the President of the United States, a President they had supported when he ran for Congress in 1940. This single speech, more than any other action by any other individual or group, was likely responsible for convincing the two union leaders to reconsider the President’s most recent offer.

The nation had waited anxiously for weeks holding its collective breath, waiting to see which side, if either, would be the first to blink. The President’s speech made it clear that it wouldn’t be the Government. By early the next morning, the White House had received more than two thou-
sand telegrams from across the nation, running 30 to 1 in favor of the President ("National Affairs," p. 20). Buoyed by this show of support from ordinary citizens of all political persuasions, the President was more determined than ever to press forward with a bold policy initiative that was designed to force the strikers back to work and was certain to take everyone by surprise.

At 4:00PM on Saturday, May 25, Truman stepped to the podium in the House chamber to begin his address. Standing before his former Congressional colleagues, he began by reiterating his personal sympathy towards American labor and his legislative involvement in labor issues on behalf of working men and women throughout his national political career. “The benefits which labor has gained in the last thirteen years must be preserved,” he stated. “I voted for all these benefits while I was a member of the Congress. As President of the United States I have repeatedly urged not only their retention but their improvement. I shall continue to do so” (Koenig, p. 237). Having reminded everyone, particularly the unions, of his pro-labor inclination, he moved on, tearing into the union bosses yet again.

This particular crisis has been brought about by the obstinate arrogance of two men – Mr. Alvanley Johnston, president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and Mr. A. F. Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen. Eighteen other unions and all of the railroad companies of the nation are ready to run the railroads. And these two men have tried to stop them.

We are dealing with a handful of men who are striking against their own government and against every one of their fellow citizens, and against themselves. We are dealing with a handful of men who have it within their power to cripple the entire economy of the nation (Koenig, p. 237).

The President told the nation once more that Johnston and Whitney were, collectively, public enemy number one. Having clearly stated the problem and the desperate situation that the actions of the union leaders had created, and having heaped scorn, blame, ridicule, and public humiliation on them, it was now time for Truman to move on to his proposed solution. To deal with the railroads, he proceeded to ask Congress to grant him temporary emergency powers for a period of six months to “authorize the institution of injunctive or mandatory proceedings against any union leader, forbidding him from encouraging or inciting members of the union to leave their work or to refuse to return to work” and to “deprive workers of their seniority rights who, without good cause, persist in striking against the government; provide criminal penalties against employers and union leaders” (Koenig, p.238). Truman had one more trick up his sleeve in his fight with the unions, one which was sure to immediately grab the attention of the union leaders and of all of the striking workers: “As part of this temporary emergency legislation I request the Congress immediately to authorize the President to draft into the armed forces of the United States all workers who are on strike against their government” (Koenig, p. 238). Time magazine likened the President’s proposals as the equivalent of dropping a legislative atomic bomb ("National Affairs,” 1946).
No sooner had he finished this portion of his speech when Leslie Biffle, Secretary of the Senate, interrupted him at the podium handing him a note. The President paused, read the note and broke the news of its contents to the assembled legislators, “Word has just been received that the rail strike has been settled on terms proposed by the President” (Koenig, p. 238). Wild cheering broke out as the House chamber erupted in near pandemonium at the news.

Even the news that the strike had been settled could not assuage congressional ire. Labor had sealed its fate, the die had been cast. Anger at the actions of the unions led the House to overwhelmingly pass the President’s request for emergency powers by a vote of 306 to 13 after less than 100 minutes of debate. Cooler heads prevailed in the Senate; since the immediate threat to the nation was past, the President’s request was never put to a vote. Besides, legislators knew that emergency action designed to treat a symptom wasn’t the answer. The nation needed permanent legislation to fix the problem, not a six month band aid.

For almost a year labor had held various segments of the nation’s economy hostage, and now a movement was afoot in Congress to clip their wings. That movement would bear fruit a little more than a year later in the form of the Taft-Hartley Act. For his part, Truman vehemently opposed Taft-Hartley, labeling it a “slave labor” bill, and vetoed the bill when it was presented to him.

After all was said and done one overriding question remains: what, if anything, of great importance had the two unions really accomplished? Were Alvanley Johnston and Alexander Whitney justified in their actions or were they collectively, as Shakespeare’s tragic Macbeth so wisely observed “a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no more” (Shakespeare, p. 190)? Did their actions, viewed in retrospect, result in any valuable, long-term gains for labor, or were they “… full of sound and fury, signifying nothing” (Shakespeare, p. 190)? In their standoff with the government and with the President, the unions had blinked, and while the strike was over in short order, the bad blood it had engendered remained its legacy. Lawmakers were determined to craft legislation to ensure that in the future no union would have the power or the ability to hold the nation’s economy hostage in a labor dispute.

So who won in this monumental test of wills? Certainly not labor. The railroad workers ended up accepting the same settlement they had been offered before the strike was called - 18 1/2 cents an hour. The rule changes they had demanded weren’t addressed in the settlement. It was unfortunate that the two union leaders at the center of the storm couldn’t comprehend that their provocative actions and their obstinance would, in the near future, have dire consequences for the entire organized labor movement. The old maxim that every action has an equal and opposite reaction had never been more true.

To say that the two labor leaders completely misjudged the situation would be an understatement. Johnston and Whitney could not possibly have been blind to the fact that a railroad strike would be a violation of the public trust, not to mention a public relations nightmare. They could not possibly have been blind to the fact that their actions would put the livelihoods, and in many instances the very lives of American citizens at risk. They could not possibly have been blind to the
fact that, given the climate of anger and fear that existed in 1946 America, their actions could reasonably be expected to provoke a drastic legislative backlash that would be detrimental to both organized labor in general and their own constituency in particular. They could not possibly have been blind…and yet it seems they were. They persisted in their course of action, pushing the envelope further and raising the stakes higher with each settlement opportunity they chose to ignore. Like characters in a Shakespearian tragedy, hubris would overtake them in the end. The would-be heroes would end up being the goats. John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers, may have been more belligerent and confrontational, and Joe Curran, head of the maritime unions, was perhaps more radical and politically dangerous, but more than any other labor leaders, it was the actions of Whitney and Johnston that would contribute to a major anti-labor backlash among the non-unionized majority of American workers, and especially in the halls of Congress. They tried their power against the power of a sitting President, and lost. The railroad strike, while lasting a mere 2 days, created a palpable sense of betrayal and outrage for the majority of Americans. Along with Congress, non-union workers, nearly 65 percent of the workforce, were fed up.

While the Taft-Hartley Act was a direct response to the wave of strikes that gripped the nation in the aftermath of the war, and not to one labor action in particular, the railroad strike was the proverbial stick that broke the camel’s back, the last straw, so to speak. The bill took a hard line on strike activity, specifically outlawing industry-wide strikes and mandating cooling off periods. Its intent was clearly to curb the ability of unions to use their power to the detriment of the nation or its citizens. It is worth noting that union membership began to drop after 1945, a trend that continued steadily, with a few minor exceptions, for the next 60 plus years. By 2008, union membership as a percentage of the total workforce had declined from 35.5 percent in 1945 to 12.4 percent.

Did Truman win? Perhaps he won the battle, but he did not the war. While he ultimately prevailed in settling the rail strike on his terms, his prestige had been greatly diminished by his inability to avert it in the first place. Labor had sullied his reputation, made him look impotent and unable to deal with crises. While he had worked honestly and steadfastly to balance the rights of the unions against the national interest, the drastic actions he took to force a speedy settlement of the strike succeeded in alienating organized labor, a group critical to the Democratic Party and to his own political future. Their estrangement would last more than two years. No one in public office can alienate 35.5 percent of the working population without paying a heavy price. It is likely that a single act on Truman’s part was responsible for securing him a second term – his veto of the Taft-Hartley bill in 1947. Even though the veto was overridden by Congress and the law was enacted, the fact that he had stood up and spoken out for labor on this critical issue helped him tremendously. He did not oppose the bill for rank opportunistic political gain, however, but because he truly believed it to be unfair and overarching. While some of his aggressive actions during the post-war period of economic reconversion may have suggested otherwise, Truman was, at his very core, a friend of labor and he had no interest in seeing unions permanently disadvantaged. As a proud, loyal, and lifelong Democrat, that was not the labor legacy he wanted to leave to posterity.

Politics makes strange bedfellows and labor realized that even a fickle Democrat like Tru-
man was still better for them than a Republican alternative. After all, Republicans had been primarily responsible for drafting the hated anti-labor legislation, and even though he had failed, Harry Truman had at least made an honest effort to stop it. In the end, labor came around – they held their noses and supported him in 1948. In one of the closest elections in history, the votes of labor union members absolutely did make a difference, quite possibly the difference between victory and defeat. While labor support for Truman was not universal in the 1948 election, the labor support he did receive helped to ensure that the headline “Dewey Defeats Truman” which blared famously from the front page of the Chicago Tribune on November 3, 1948, would become known to posterity as one of the biggest gaffes in twentieth century journalism rather than as the truth. Supporting Truman in the election, however, didn’t mean that the unions were ready to kiss and make up; in return for the votes of their members, they would be looking for some favors in the President’s second term. Their expectations would remain largely unfulfilled, and Harry Truman would continue to actively assert himself and his Administration in a number of high profile labor/management disputes throughout his second term. Imagine the collective consternation and sense of betrayal the unions must have felt when he of all people proceeded to invoke Taft-Hartley a dozen times prior to leaving office in 1953.

Harry Truman’s direct involvement in the negotiation process between labor and management set the tone for future Executive branch labor/management activism. While Roosevelt had been known to call a CEO on the phone to twist an arm on behalf of labor as he had done with William Knudsen, the head of General Motors in 1937, the model Truman had helped to define would require future Presidents to expend much more personal energy and political capital by directly involving themselves, for better or worse, in negotiations and decision making. This model reached its zenith in August 1981, when air traffic controllers called a strike. President Ronald Reagan ordered the strikers back to work under terms of the Taft-Hartley Act. When more than 11,000 strikers ignored the back to work order, they were summarily fired by Reagan.

President Roosevelt had toyed with the idea of drafting striking workers during the Philadelphia Transit strike in 1944, but Truman’s radical proposal for emergency executive power to draft strikers was the first and, to date, the only such proposal to be formally presented to Congress. It raises a myriad of complex administrative issues that never had to be faced, but the mere fact that he had the power to make it at all had forced the union’s hand.

References


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Stephanie P. Newbold’s *All but Forgotten: Thomas Jefferson and the Development of Public Administration* contributes to the literature on Thomas Jefferson and his place in the development of public administration. The importance of Jefferson’s contribution to the era of the Founding Fathers cannot be understated. Scholars do not dispute the importance of Jefferson’s ideas in the pursuit of independence and creation of the Republic. But historians and public administration scholars have differed on Jefferson’s importance as a developer of administrative practices.

Newbold states that the primary purpose of this book “aims at casting Jefferson in a more historically accurate role with regard to his contribution to American constitutional theory, administrative practice, and the democratic governance process.” (p. 8) Newbold argues that no public administration scholar has thoroughly studied Jefferson’s executive branch management and argues that his administrative and political role in establishing the University of Virginia has received even less attention. She rejects the views of administrative historians such as Leonard White (1951), Lynton Caldwell (1988), and Donald Kettl (2002) that Jefferson made “relatively little contribution to the intellectual, institutional, and historical development of American public administration” (p. xv). She argues that careful consideration of the primary documents reveals Jefferson’s transformation from a primarily theoretical thinker to being an important contributor to American administrative history.

The book opens with a chapter on Jefferson’s revolutionary thought in the period 1770 to 1800. Newbold describes the analysis of White, Caldwell, and Kettl that Jefferson’s administrative and constitutional views were deficient in comparison to those of Madison and Hamilton. Jefferson is considered to have made considerable contributions to theories of religious freedom, the rights of man and republican government, but he does not show how to implement these within the constitutional framework. Jefferson’s views on religious freedom in public education and their role in establishing and maintaining good government are present, but the practical side is not considered well developed. The chapter goes on to discuss Jefferson’s strict constructionist understanding of constitutional theory prior to becoming President. His position is presented through the debate with Hamilton on the cre-
ation of the Bank of the United States, his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts, and his subsequent anonymous authoring of the Kentucky Resolution. Through his positions Jefferson clearly favored constitutional limits on federal authority, and was willing to go so far as to advocate nullification of the Alien and Sedition Acts through the Kentucky Resolution, albeit anonymously.

Chapter two focuses on the development of Jefferson’s administrative thinking during his years as President. She describes the view of many administrative theorists as represented by White and Kettl who argue that Jefferson possessed a more speculative mind than an administrative one. She contrasts this with the view of most historians and political scientists that Jefferson was heavily involved in day-to-day governance. Newbold describes Jefferson’s administrative style as innovative, differing from that of either Washington or Adams. Jefferson sought the most able administrators to fill his Cabinet and fostered open communication with them, encouraging real exchanges of opinion while reserving final decision-making authority to himself. He relied on these capable men, particularly James Madison and Albert Gallatin, to inform him and to carry out administrative decisions. These men worked with Congress in an unprecedented fashion helping to craft legislation and sat on committees when needed. Jefferson also fostered a strong working relationship with Congress. He was helped, no doubt, by the dominance of the Jeffersonian Republicans in that period, but he did not take this for granted and cultivated his party leadership so much so that he is thought by historians to be the first president to directly lead his party. Newbold illustrates these administrative practices by examining more closely the Jeffersonian decision to reverse Hamilton’s fiscal policies by reducing the debt, his angst-ridden reversal of his own strict constructionist beliefs with the purchase of the Louisiana territory, and his embargo policies designed to keep the United States from entering the war with Britain or France.

In what is perhaps the most compelling section of the book, Newbold discusses Jefferson’s role in the creation of the University of Virginia during his retirement. She argues that this period in his life is often overlooked but is vital to understanding of Jefferson’s administrative theory. She emphasizes that this contribution would have been impossible had it not been for the growth in administrative ability that took place during his presidency. Jefferson’s attempt to bring policy to fruition which would support his long-held espousal of the need for public education for the health and longevity of the establishment of a republic was borne out in his endeavor to create the University of Virginia. Newbold describes in great detail Jefferson’s tireless efforts at fostering support for the creation of University of Virginia and his day-to-day involvement in the creation of the University from the architectural planning to the hiring of faculty to the design of curriculum. His frustrating failure to gain Virginia State legislative support for broader public education did not temper his zeal in pursuit of the establishment of a public institution of higher education that would support the long-term viability of republican government through the training of able administrators to serve that government. As Newbold rightly points out, it is in this period that Jefferson makes the demonstrable connection between theory and practice, between politics and administration.

In the final chapter, Newbold connects her observations with the work of Stephen Skowronek (1997), Philip Selznick (1957), and Larry Terry (2003). She argues that her findings support
Skowronek’s view of Jefferson as a reconstructive leader both during his presidency and in his work to found the University of Virginia. Similarly she sees Jefferson as fitting Terry’s description of a conservator, both as President and in his role in the creation of University of Virginia. She connects Jefferson’s leadership with Selznick’s work on how organizations become institutions and the importance of institutional statesmanship. She finds that the attributes Selznick finds necessary for institutional leadership are present in Jefferson. What has perhaps not been adequately considered before is the essential nature of Jefferson’s leadership in the creation of the University of Virginia as an institution.

Newbold’s work is an important contribution to the understanding of Jefferson’s position in the development of public administration in the United States. Her emphasis on his role in the creation of the University of Virginia is particularly valuable. While preparing this manuscript, this reviewer had the opportunity to visit Jefferson’s estate Monticello. Doing so afforded me further evidence of the remarkable capacity of this former president and complemented Newbold’s position. Anyone who has seen the attention to detail evident in his home cannot but be convinced of his administrative capacity. And just as his theoretical nature is present, so also is his administrative mind. And both capacities are well presented in Newbold’s work.

References


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Handbook of Administrative History and The Civil Service in the 21st Century


Reviewed by William J. Miller

As the field of public administration reaches the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, much research focuses entirely on emerging trends and issues. While it is necessary for such research to emerge if we hope to continue to be relevant to both academics and practitioners, current research appears to come with little recognition of the scholars and theories that have built the field. Some scholars, however, have worked diligently to preserve the past of public administration while still working to assure that research remains germane to emerging trends. In the area of administration and the civil service, Jos Raadschelders has worked to assure that neither the past nor the present are sacrificed at the expense of the other. His Handbook of Administrative History has proven to be an authoritative source for the historical development of administration across the globe, while The Civil Service in the 21st Century (edited by Raadschelders, Theo Toonen, and Frits Van der Meet) successfully highlights the current and emerging developments related to administration and civil service employees in an international context. Through these two works, we can trace the past, present, and future of administrative studies the world over.

In the preface to Handbook of Administrative History, Raadschelders articulates the rationale for why the project was undertaken: to highlight the long-standing tradition of public administration, to show the necessity for understanding past decisions and old traditions in order to be sound contemporary administrators, to make the history of administration more accessible to scholars and practitioners, and to help merge the work of historians and administrative scientists in one
place (1998, ix-xi). In short, he seeks to examine the relationship between administrative science and administrative history.

The handbook is divided into four sections with a total of twelve chapters. The first section serves as an overview of the scope and methods of administrative history and begins with two chapters that provide a synopsis of what administrative history is and why it is useful and an overview of the relevant literature and sources in different regions of the world. The final two chapters in the section look more at methodology and closely examine the different types of research used and how they fit with the social sciences. The second section is made up of three chapters that look at what Raadschelders deems “administrative history proper.” The chapters focus on the development of tasks, organizations, bureaucracies, and actors. Each chapter includes an introductory section that clearly explains the theoretical underpinnings of what is to follow. The third section of the book expands on the second with four chapters that continue the examination of administrative history by attempting to show how it fits in a broader sense. To do so, the chapters look at topics like the relationship between citizen and state, the process of nation-building, and the development of international relations. The concluding chapter to section three works to place administrative history within the scholarship of public administration.

The first three sections of the book, in and of themselves, serve a valuable service to the field of public administration as they bring together the works of scholars from a variety of fields to help weave a cohesive story regarding the value of administrative history to our understandings of modern public administration. Raadschelders demonstrates throughout the handbook how valuable history’s emphasis on context can be to public administrators as they work through modern problems. After all, while no situation may be the same, there are examples from the past that can provide some guidance. At the same time, Raadschelders attempts to show that administrative historians still have much to learn from public administrators – particularly when considering the pursuit of patterns and trends that can be compared across different levels (whether cities, countries, or international systems).

These three sections – which formulate the majority of the actual text in the handbook – provide a wealth of information for individuals interested in the historic development of administration. Raadschelder’s desire to examine the linkage between administrative history and administrative science at its face is a truly enormous task that necessitates the collection of sources from around the globe from 1500 to the present. While difficult enough, given the handbook structure of the volume, he also must organize the text in a way that it is accessible quickly. In these two regards, he is highly successful. Every chapter demonstrates the literature that it is based on and, more importantly, the table of contents for the handbook successfully allows interested readers to quickly locate the information of interest to them through the well-labeled sections in the main text. For example, consider Chapter Ten – “International Relations: Between Universal Authority and Balance of Power.” Within thirty pages, Raadschelders attempts to paint a clear, cohesive picture of the interrelationship between administrative history and the development of international relations. For a scholar, student, or practitioner attempting to use the handbook for a particular topic,
sections are clearly marked and paginated in the table of contents that breakdown the chapter by key facet (such as From Pax Dei to Pax Gentium) or chronology (The Expansion of Western European States: The Second Imperial Age, 1830-1914). This structure makes the vast amount of literature included by the author easily accessible for those utilizing it.

Raadschelers’ first three sections are uneven in one key regard – international coverage. In section one – where the scope of the discipline is examined – he attempts to assure that he presents information that is truly international, covering as many geographic areas as standing research allowed. However, sections two and three of the handbook clearly present a Western European/American bias with the information and literature presented. Raadschelder, however, acknowledges this potential issue in the preface. After reading through sections two and three, it appears that the inclusion of more geographic regions potentially would weigh readers with information overload. As such, his approach appears more than reasonable.

The final section of the handbook is perhaps its most valuable – a nearly 100 page bibliography of authoritative sources pulled from multiple disciplines that are broken down by topic and region. Works of historians, public administrators, sociologists, political scientists, and legal scholars are combined to provide interested researchers and practitioners with the ability to quickly find a wealth of information on the topic and/or region of their choosing. In the bibliography, Raadschelders attempts, as best he can, to make amends for the lack of inclusion of regions and nations outside of Western Europe and the United States. The simple fact is that there is considerably less scholarship to utilize and build off of on administration in Africa or East Asia than in the regions that are more fully represented. While the bibliography serves to be extremely useful to scholars or practitioners attempting to start a search of relevant literature, a table of contents would be useful within the bibliography given that it is broken into some eighty categories.

The Handbook of Administrative History does an exemplary job of painting a picture of how administrative science and history have developed through a series of fields; The Civil Service in the 21st Century (edited by Raadschelers, Toonen, and Van der Meet), on the other hand, articulates the state of administration and civil service in various regions around the globe. Based on a much larger project – the Civil Service System in Comparative Perspective – the work centers itself on a definition of civil service that reads: “mediating institutions for the mobilization of human resources in the service of the state in a given territory” (11). The edited volume consists of nineteen chapters separated into four sections.

The first section of the book most directly helps to alleviate some of the shortcomings in Raadschelers’ handbook by focusing on regional developments in civil service. The five chapters within this section present information on civil service developments in Central and Eastern Europe (Tony J. G. Verheijen and Aleksandra Rabrenovic), Western Europe (Frits M. Van der Meer, Trui Steen, and Anchrit Willie), the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom (John Halligan), Asia (John Burns), and Africa (Ladipo Adamolekun). All of the chapters spend some time examining the developmental history of civil service within the region but concentrate primarily
on looking at the past two decades. The chapter on Africa is particularly useful as it adds much to a previously under-developed section of the literature. Further, the theoretical underpinnings of civil service development discussed in the Africa chapter can be adapted and used to examine any country of choice in the region. The only detriment to the section is that South and Latin America are not represented. Raadschelders, Toonen, and Van der Meer explain the absence of South and Latin America by stating that two of the papers from an earlier conference (on Argentina and Nicaragua) had been previously published.

Moving from the regional examination of national civil service systems, section two focuses instead on supranational and multi-level governance. Chapters include discussions of the implications of multi-level governance on national civil service systems (Caspar van den Berg and Theo Toonen), the potential impact of exogenous factors on national civil service systems (Phillippe Bezes and Martin Lodge), the effects of subnational public service in the United Kingdom and France (Sabine Kuhlmann and Jorg Bogumil), the role of the oft-ignored middle level bureaucrat in policymaking (Edward Page), and the assumed differences between public and private reforms of human resource management (Per Laegreid and Lois Recasino Wise). The section looks carefully at a series of often neglected topics in public administration, even comparatively. However, a chapter that specifically examined the European Union would have been particularly useful given the acknowledgement that it truly is a new form of hybrid government. While a few chapters touch on issues related to the EU, the subject matter is muddled with other competing areas. Overall, the section brings to light many issues of interest (such as multi-level governance, subnational actors, and middle level bureaucrats in varying systems) that are otherwise largely neglected or treated as an afterthought by the comparative literature.

The third section of the volume switches gears and turns to more normative questions of civil service systems. In particular, the section looks at legality, efficiency, and responsiveness – three often assumed traits of most national civil service systems. Chapters examine comparative assessment of judicial reach and its impact on public management (Robert Christensen and Charles Wise), constitutional responsibilities of the American civil service system (John Rohr), how to measure responsibility, accountability, and performance comparatively (Gerrit Dijkstra), and an assessment of Weberian, New Public Management, and governance perspectives on environmental interactions (Guy Peters and Jon Pierre). What makes this chapter unique is that it examines often discussed terms in the civil service literature (such as performance, efficiency, and legalism) but does so in a comparative context that allows for a growth in the literature rather than the mere repeating of already established facts in a different national or regional context.

The final section serves multiple purposes; it synthesizes the information gleaned from the first three sections before moving on to examine questions of potential reform in the 21st century. In particular, the section attempts to examine the relationship between potential civil service reforms and the political-administrative system at large. The three chapters examine the questions of how much institutional tradition and culture truly matter when it comes to system reform (Richard Stillman), how issue salience potentially impacts when politicians and politics will in-
tervene in reform measures aimed at improving the civil service system in a nation (Luc Rouban), and whether systemic reform must accompany civil service and administrative reforms if we wish to see change truly occur (Jos Raadschelders and Marie-Louise Bemelmans-Videc). This section, again, raises interesting questions that had often been previously ignored. However, this section fails to go as far as possible with its inquiry by failing to address the potential for states to exist without civil service systems to serve as administrators.

For those scholars and practitioners interested in the development of administration as a field and the present state of the civil service systems across the globe, these two works by Jos Raadschelders are volumes to possess. While both works have minor faults (a lack of consistent regional references in the handbook and a missed opportunity to cover the entire globe and ask even more pressing questions in the edited volume), together they formulate a story that clearly traces the development of administration from approximately 1500 into the 21st century. Handbook of Administrative History provides a reader friendly volume organized in a way that the nearly hundred page bibliography becomes useful and easily managed. Likewise, The Civil Service System in the 21st Century brings together some of the top scholars in the field of comparative administration to discuss the present state of the civil service in the world and to consider what the emerging trends and questions will be as the new century continues to grow. In this vein, Raadschelders has demonstrated the ability to do exactly what this special issue has asked all of us to attempt: continue pressing to move the field forward but not forgetting the work and scholars that have helped to get us to where we are today.

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Democracy and Administration: Woodrow Wilson’s Ideas and the Challenges of Public Management


Reviewed by John R. Phillips

The vagaries of history have inextricably bound Woodrow Wilson to the founding narrative of public administration as a discipline. That narrative, part reality and part mythology, focuses on the administrative ideas Wilson set forth in his famous 1887 essay “The Study of Administration.” That much is reality. The narrative also focuses on the politics-administration dichotomy, largely as developed and interpreted by Wilson’s scholarly successors. It is there that much of the mythology arises, although recent scholars have increasingly absolved Wilson of responsibility for the more extreme statements of the dichotomy. For those seeking the “real” Woodrow Wilson whether as scholar, politician, or statesman, Brian Cook has now provided an essential guide. For those interested in the history of public administration, Democracy and Administration is also a rich, comprehensive, and highly readable analysis of the evolution of Wilson’s administrative thought and his role as a founding thinker of the discipline.

Cook divides his study into three components: Part I is a historical and theoretical analysis of Wilson’s political-administrative ideas; Part II is an examination of his administrative practices as Governor of New Jersey and, later, as President of the United States; and Part III is an exploration of the continuing relevance of Wilson’s administrative ideas, especially as they relate to the new public management.

Cook is careful to relate the evolution of Wilson’s thinking about politics and administration to the socio-economic-political conditions of his time. The decades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the period of Wilson’s scholarly writing, were decades of great social change. The social consequences of immigration, urbanization, and industrialization posed severe challenges to governments of the day. In the view of Wilson and other writers of the time, bossism, political machines, and political corruption incapacitated state and local governments. At the national level, too, they saw a Congressional-Presidential system that was inadequate to the conditions of the time due to the near dominance of Congress and the political paralysis they attributed to the separation of powers doctrine.
This inability of governments to respond appropriately to the needs of the country underlies, in part, Wilson’s near fixation on the virtues of British Cabinet-style government and the need for a “responsible” party system. This fixation was shaped and reinforced by Wilson’s scholarly analysis of the problems, an analysis deeply shaped by a historical, evolutionary, and developmental approach to the subject. Governments, Wilson wrote, passed through three developmental periods – absolute rule, the rise of constitutional systems, and, finally, the development by the “sovereign people” of administrative systems appropriate to the constitutional orders. As Wilson saw it, Britain had successfully arrived at the administrative stage while the United States remained at the constitutional stage.

The role of the “sovereign people” in administration is important in that it sheds light on an aspect of Wilson’s thought that has been obscured by the inordinate scholarly preoccupation with the politics-administration dichotomy. Wilson was deeply concerned with the organic integration of the state, the political development of its citizens, the involvement of their elected representatives in the administrative system of the nation, and the ways in which the governmental and political systems could be reshaped to achieve these purposes. Accepting the impossibility of radical Constitutional restructuring, he nevertheless thought that effective, efficient, and responsive administration could be best achieved through some approximation of the “responsible party” model and Cabinet-style government. Wilson’s attempt to put these ideas into practice is important in evaluating his successes and failures as Governor and President.

The evaluation of Wilson the practitioner divides along the lines of those who write of him as a man of “conviction” and those who treat him as a realistic, pragmatic politician willing to compromise principle to achieve purpose or, as Cook describes it, the “idealist” versus the “realist.” On the positive side, Wilson attempted with considerable success to implement, in practice, a responsible Cabinet form of governance at both state and national levels. In that attempt, he delegated broad administrative authority for both policy and management to his Cabinet members, allowing them considerable autonomy and freedom from interference. Likewise, he practiced – again with considerable success – a prime ministerial leadership role in his relations with the New Jersey legislature and with Congress. On the negative side, Cook notes, Wilson’s greatest failures are well known: support of racial segregation, war-time restrictions on civil liberties, a conflicted position with regard to patronage appointments, unwillingness to tolerate dissent, and failure to get Senate ratification of the Versailles Treaty.

Wilson’s deviations from theoretical ideals are to a considerable extent explained by his personality and by the crisis of the Great War. His personality was such that he was intolerant of dissenting opinions and went to great lengths to avoid interpersonal conflicts and “difficult situations.” He thus had a tendency to let the failings of colleagues and subordinates get out of hand and to neglect administrative and managerial problems rather than confronting and correcting them. His failings in this regard are underscored by the comment of Colonel House, one of his principal advisers, that Wilson was “one of the great men of the world today, but he sadly lacks administrative ability” (Cook, 2007: 183).
Deviations from his theoretical ideals are also attributable to the demands of the war: the compelling need to make extensive and wide-ranging ad hoc adjustments to administrative processes, the press of rapid mobilization, and the conversion of industrial production to the needs of a war economy. In addition, the demands on the President for national public leadership of the war effort distracted his attention from routine details of administration. This change became dramatically obvious once he instituted an informal “War Cabinet” upon whose members he relied for advice affecting the conduct of war. Other, more routine, administrative functions were handled by the Cabinet, proper, with much less involvement on the part of the President. Cook suggests, however, that these developments can be seen as consistent with Wilson’s theoretical ideals. If the divisions of responsibility between the official and the unofficial Cabinet did not perfectly match Wilson’s vision of the British ideal, they did approximate that ideal to some degree. More specifically, the smaller War Cabinet was a deliberative and collaborative body with which Wilson seemed comfortable, a setting in which collective decision making on the order of the British model was more likely. It would push the British analogy too far to say that during the war the formal Cabinet became something of a “permanent under-secretariat” for domestic affairs but it is, perhaps, not too far off the mark.

The degree to which Wilson succeeded in achieving his theoretical ideals is less important than the continuing relevance of those ideals for our own time. The organic nature of his thinking, the emphasis on the full development of the citizen within the state, the need for public managers and executives with “large powers and unhampered discretion,” and the requirement for dynamic political leadership attuned to, as well as leading, public opinion are as important today as they were in Wilson’s time. Public budgeting (an area in which Wilson was notably unsuccessful) and occasional legislative gridlock remind us that Wilson, Goodnow, and others of his day sought practical ways to get beyond (or around) Constitutional rigidities. The emphasis on science and the development of both a science of politics and a science of administration continue to be the foundations of training for public service as they were then. As public administration has moved through its various fads and phases, from scientific management to the new public management, it is a tribute to Wilson’s enduring importance that he isolated and addressed the important themes that are still with us today. In bringing these themes to us through such a carefully researched and well written volume, Brian Cook has made an important contribution to our understanding of public administration in Wilson’s time and in our own.

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Much has been written about Aaron Burr, and much of it may now be considered false according to the new views offered by University of Tulsa historian Nancy Isenberg, who undertook a significant journey into Burr’s life to discern the fact from the fiction. Readers should carefully consider if this is merely another revisionist history which is so popular among a new generation of historians today or a real reevaluation of the life of an important founding father largely misunderstood and largely misrepresented by history. Either way, Isenberg provides something refreshing to talk about when we speak of Burr and other flawed geniuses of the past and present. Essentially, it is a fact that we often get it wrong, and wrong notions can be perpetuated more than a hundred years into the future.

Throughout history since his life and death, Burr has been painted in a dark, complicated mosaic of a man of means who grew in stature and reputation only to become the man who killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel, a Vice President of the United States who was accused as a traitor and womanizer. Probably the only man of his generation more reviled was Benedict Arnold. Yet, dauntlessly, Isenberg undertakes the task of rehabilitating the Burr name for the first time in history through painstaking research and documentation, and does so convincingly. It is not immediately known how the book was received by the professional history community, especially those who believe that Burr’s legacy has already been accurately documented and those opposed to revisionist history, as this work could be viewed. Isenberg labors on regardless in an effort to shed new light on a misunderstood figure in American history.

In Chapter One, A Man of Promising Parts, Isenberg cannot help but offer a brief moment of counterfactual history, or what could have been, if only. It seems that both Hamilton and Burr applied to Princeton and while Hamilton went on to Columbia, Burr did attend Princeton. She proposes that Hamilton may have developed a different relationship with Burr had they attended the same university, the same classes, joined the same clubs, and both been a part of the influential early Princeton alumni who relied on each other for political and personal favors in later years (p. 9). Hamilton never forgave Princeton for refusing him admission and may have de-
veloped a negative view of Princeton alumni of which of course Burr was one (this supposition is the reviewer’s only).

In regard to the intense and extensive amount of research that goes into this new version of Burr, one only needs to consult more than 125 pages of Notes and Index, with most of the Notes rather well annotated, to get a feel of the overall depth of research in this work. Although it should be noted that Burr’s public papers and private journals and many letters of correspondence to and from him were lost in a shipwreck meaning that much that had been written about him and what we know of him today comes from the prejudicial public media and the even more detrimental writings of his critics and political enemies – and even a few novelists (Gore Vidal and Eudora Welty) and a few playwrights. This in some way tells us why his reputation has been assailed throughout history without answer to the contrary. Even his family, who may have defended him to history, also died before him. On the contrary, both Hamilton and Jefferson, and many others, had ample opportunity to edit their written history and had family who lived on for years working diligently to protect their reputations from controversial conflicts among early historians of the era. Burr, on the other hand, seemed content to leave his papers unedited and not to write his own defense for posterity. Why, no one knows for sure, it was just his nature to let his actions speak for him, even as they could have been misunderstood under the spin of his enemies.

Indeed, in this reviewer’s view, it was Jefferson himself that benefited the most from the famous duel that took Hamilton’s life. Unlike Hamilton and Burr, Jefferson did not enjoy the wide regard and adulation of being a war hero. In his vanity, this could not be presumed to have not influenced his feelings of angst against Hamilton and more than some jealousy for his Vice President, who certainly could become the next President. So, it would not have much mattered whether Hamilton killed Burr or vice versa since, with one dead, the other would be ostracized from contemporary politics and indeed from historical fame. And this seems to be what has occurred, as our most revered founding father from grade school to college is most usually Thomas Jefferson; while Hamilton and Burr seem to be often relegated to a brief and tragic footnote in history. Jefferson clearly did not have any affection for either Hamilton or Burr and would have been satisfied with any event that would have erased their names from history, if that was possible. Based solely on how carefully many of these men edited their papers is an indication that they had a sense of history and cared a great deal about what history would ultimately say about them.

Another interesting view of Burr that is proposed by Isenberg’s research is that he quite possibly is one of the first feminists in American history. He married a worldly woman ten years his senior and treated both his wife and his daughter as equals. He supported education, not just “home economics” education, but real classical education for his daughter and exchanged many letters with his wife that reflected his respect for her opinion on many worldly issues that would not normally be considered “parlor sofa” talk of the times for which most women were engaged. Further, Burr defended women’s rights over many matters including suffrage, divorce, education, and an equal claim to happiness. This was not the attitude of a womanizer or a man who objectified sex and sexual relations as history would tell us of Burr.
One of the most egregious attacks on Burr’s character, and the attack that lead most precipitously to the duel, was the accusation that Burr was having an incestuous affair with his beloved daughter, which was gossip being promulgated by Hamilton and then subsequently picked up by others, including Jefferson. And of course, Burr was also being accused of homosexual proclivities, since he was a man that exuded a sexual energy, almost a feminine personality, but he attracted both men and women even though there was never any real evidence of his crossing the line with his sexual activity. He seemed quite content with his wife, and he loved his daughter dearly, but in all the right ways only.

The final words of Isenberg on Burr are very telling not just about Burr but about his contemporaries. It is in these words that the “flawed geniuses” (concept by this reviewer only) applies. These all were men of their age, sexual satire pervaded politics (p. 413). Burr was a means for his enemies to increase their own political capital and the vocabulary was already part of the political scene.

“Aaron Burr’s life…his experiences, his mistakes, and his radical insights combine to give us a better picture of the political culture that defined his generation…The founders contributed wisdom and often exhibited courage. But to remove them from the political time in which they lived as if they were ever, on a single day, holy men or paragons of virtue misses their true vocation and their true motivation. They did not live inside an impossibly romantic political forum where great minds communed on a regular basis to remind each other of their noblest ideals…They spent their time engaged in polite banter of the tea parlor, indulged in secret sexual trysts with prostitutes, mistresses, and even slaves” (pgs. 413-414). Yet, they emerged each day to take up their duties in courageously trying to create a more perfect union.

Finally, Isenberg reminds us that “these were our founding fathers: imperfect men in a less than perfect nation grasping at opportunities. That they did good for their country is understood and worth our celebration; that they were also jealous, resentful, self-protective, and covetous politicians should be no less a part of their collective biography…myth averts our eyes from the truth when it turns men into heroes and gods” (p. 414). In many regards, they may not have been far too far off from contemporary men and women of political power.

This is a book well worth reading, well worth the time to consider all that this young, upcoming historian has to tell us about a most misunderstood hero of the revolution, gifted lawyer, feminist, and elected leader of the nation when it was so very new and fragile. This book should also inform us to be a bit more circumspect when hearing or reading of contemporary politicians’ ethical indiscretions, since the “flawed geniuses” are still with us today. Is their work any less important, or are their indiscretions any more reviled than those of our most revered founding fathers?

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